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In 1994, DoD implemented managed care and a capitation-based resource 
allocation model within the Military Health Services System (MHSS). This study 
examines the evolution of DoD's model and its impact on resource managers. 
Personal and telephonic interviews were conducted with key individuals from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)), Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), and at the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) level. 
A review of the literature on capitation and managed care, including books, white 
papers, monographs, and journal articles were undertaken. The thesis concludes that 
the capitation methodology that OASD(HA) and the Services follow is a population-
based model. BUMED allocates Defense Health Program (DHP) funds on the basis 
of capitation categories down to the activity level. However, the MTF resource 
manager apportions DHP funds to the departments based on historical and workload 
considerations. Due to a lack of a patient level cost accounting module in the present 
accounting system, actual execution against a capitated resource allocation is not 
possible. Because of other limitations in the present structure, MTFs under BUMED 
still use traditional incremental budgeting in allocating funds to their various 
departments. Thus, the adoption and implementation of a capitation-based financing 
system had limited impact on resource management at the activity level. 
v 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. GENERAl, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. BACKGRO~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
D. SCOPE ................................................. 5 
E. LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 6 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND :METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
G. DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . 7 
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
II. CAPITATION BUDGETING IN THE CIVILIAN MANAGED CARE 
ENVIRON:MENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
A. MANAGED HEALTH CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
2. Growth and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
3. A Continuum of Models ............................... 16 
a. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) . . . . . . . . . . 16 
b. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) ............ 17 
c. Point of Service (POS) Plans . . . . . . . . ............. 18 
d. Hybrid ofHealth Care Alternatives ................ 19 
4. Elements of a Managed Care Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
a. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Vll 
b. Quality Services and Outcomes ................... 22 
c. Utilization Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
d. Risk Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
5. Summary .......................................... 24 
B. CAPITATION ........................................... 26 
1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
2. Objectives and Theory ................................ 27 
3. Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
a. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 
b. Risk Sharing ................................. 29 
c. Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
(1) Positive Incentives ....................... 30 
(2) Negative Incentives ...................... 31 
d. Innovations ................................... 32 
(1) Information Technology ................... 32 
(2) Incentive Pay ....... r· . . . . . . . ............ 33 
(3) Patient Access System .................... 34 
e. Rate Setting Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 
(1) Community Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
(2) Experience Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
C. PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGES ............................... 37 
D. PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGES ............................ 37 
Vlll 
E. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS .................................. 38 
F. SUJ\11\,1AR. Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 
ill. MANAGED CARE IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM ... 41 
A. THEMILITARYHEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM(MHSS) ........ 41 
1. The Direct Care System .............................. 43 
2. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
Services (CHAMPUS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 45 
3. The TRICARE Program . . . . . . . . . . .................... 48 
a. Triple Option Benefit Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
4. Lead Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
5. Managed Care Support (MCS) Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
6. Specialized Treatment Services (STS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
B. PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION OF MILITARY HEALTH 
CARE ................................................ 56 
1. The Department of the Navy's Medical Mission ............ 56 
2. The Problem ofHigh Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
a. Outpatient Care ............................... 59 
b. Inpatient Care ................................. 60 
C. CAPITATION-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE 
MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM (MHSS) . . . . . . . ..... 61 
1. Capitated Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
2. Transition of Capitation Budgeting in the MHSS . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
a. Chronology ofEvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
3. Basic Resource Allocation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
ix 
a. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military 
Personnel (MILPERS) Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
b. CHAMPUS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
4. Transfer Payments .................................. 70 
5. Shared Resource Management ............ _ ............. 71 
6. The Bid Price Adjustment (BPA) Formula ................ 73 
D. HEALTH AFFAIRS MODIFIED CAPITATION MODEL ......... 76 
1. Capitation Category I - Overseas and Military Unique 
Non-Capitated ...................................... 77 
2. Capitation Category II - Military Unique Capitated Functions 
and Education and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
3. Capitation Category III - Capitated Medical Care . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
4. Defined Beneficiary Population ......................... 80 
5. Calculation of the FY94 Capitated Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
E. SUJ\.11\1AR Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 
IV. CAPITATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
A. CAPITATION IN BUMED . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 83 
1. Direct Care Dollars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
2. Nonpatient Care Dollars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
3. CHAMPUS Dollars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
4. MILPERS Dollars . . . . . . ............................. 90 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT BUMED'S 
CAPITATION MODEL ................................... 91 
1. BUMED's Annual Work and Resource Evaluation (AWARE) 
Program .......................................... 91 
X 
2. Composite Health Care System (CHCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
3. Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System/ 
Expense Assignment System (MEPRS/EAS ill) . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
4. Resource Analysis and Planning (RAPS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
5. Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting Syste111 
(DEERS) ........................................ 94 
6. Defense Medical Information System (DMIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
7. Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System for Open System 
Environment (RCMAS-OSE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
8. Catchment Area Billing Report (CABR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
9. Regional Paid Data Management Report (RPDMR) . . . . . . . . . 96 
C. READINESS-FOCUSED CAPITATION ....................... 97 
1. Impact ofReadiness-Focused Capitation ................. 103 
a. Fixed Costs and Other Business Operating Costs . . . . . 103 
b. CONUS Healthcare Readiness Infrastructure 
Sizing Model (CHRISM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
D. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
V. IMPLEMENTATIONISSUES ................................... 107 
A. GENERAL . . . . ........................................ 107 
B. MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE ADOPTION OF A CAPITATION-
BASED APPROACH WITHIN THE MHSS .................... 108 
1. Incentives and Motivating Factor (Profit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
2. Single Enrollment Plan and Inaccuracy in Population Data . . . 112 
3. Capitation and Management Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . 114 
Xl 
4. Shift in Emphasis from Inpatient to Outpatient Care and 
Preventive Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
C. OTHERIMPLEMENTATIONISSUES ...................... 119 
1. Incomplete and Inaccurate Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 
2. Preventing the Shifting of Workload to Anothet: MTF ....... 122 
3. Exclusion of Fixed Costs in the MHSS Capitation Model . . . . 124 
4. Physician Involvement in Transition to Capitation. . . . . . . . . . 126 
D. CAPITATION AND THE MTF COMMANDER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
E. CAPITATION AND RESOURCE MANAGERS AT THE 
MTFLEVEL ........................................... 130 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 133 
A. SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
B. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 134 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ....................... 138 
APPENDIX A. MANAGED HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
APPENDIX B. STEPS IN DEVELOPING OASD(HA)'S CAPITATION 
REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
APPENDIX C. METHODOLOGY TO DEVELOP A USER POPULATION FOR 
OASD(HA)'S CAPITATION-BASED RESOURCE MODEL . . . . . 145 
LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................. 147 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 
Xll 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1. Four Key Elements of a Managed Care Network 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
20 Flow of Funds from Defense Health Program (DHP) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 
30 Navy Medicine's Dual Mission 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 
40 DHP Resources Category- FY97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 
50 Capitation Category ill Funding: Relationships of the Funding Subcategories 
and Their Respective Drivers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 
60 Health Affairs' Modified Capitation Formula 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 
70 BUMED's Capitation Allocation Process 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 
80 Flow ofDHP's Funds Under "Readiness-Focused" Capitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 
90 BUMED's Total Readiness Alignment Plan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 
Xlll 
xiv 
LIST OF TABLES 
3.1 TRICARE Option Costs for Active-duty Family Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
3.2 TRICARE Option Costs for Retirees, Survivors and Their Family 
Members ..................................................... 51 
3.3 TRICARE Regional Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
4.1 BUMED's Capitation Budgeting Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
4.2 BUMED's FY96 Funding Base ..................................... 86 



































LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Ambulatory Data System 
Automated Information System 
Annual Work and Resource Evaluation 
Base Realignment and Closure 
Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery 
Bureau ofPersonnel 
Catchment Area Billing Report 
CHAMPUS Actuarial Projection System 
Category 
Congressional Budget Office 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
Composite Health Care System 
CONUS Healthcare Readiness Infrastructure Sizing Model 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Continental United States 
CHAMPUS Reform Initiative 
Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System 
Defense Health Program 
Defense Medical Information System 
Department ofDefense 
Department of the Navy 
Defense Planning Guidance 
Diagnosis-Related Group 
Expense Assignment System ill 
Expense Operating Budget 
Fiscal Intermediary 
Fleet Marine Force 
Full Time Equivalent 
Fiscal Year 
General Accounting Office 
Graduate Medical Education 




































Health Care Financing Administration 
Health Maintenance Organization 
Health Service Region 
Healthcare Support Office 
Isolated Continental United States 
Independent Provider Organization 
Managed Care Support 
Managed Care Support Contract 
Medical Expense Performance and Reporting Systems -
Expense Assignment System ill 
Military Health Services System 
Military Personnel 
Maintenance of Real Property 
Medical Treatment Facility 
Nonavailability Statement 
Naval Primary Care Contracted Clinics 
Naval Hospital 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Health Affairs) 
Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services 
Outside the Continental United States 
Operations and Maintenance 
Other Procurement 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
Primary Care Manager 
Point-of-Service 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Preferred Provider Organization 
Readiness Alignment Plan 
Resource Analysis and Planning System 
Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System 
Regional Paid Data Management Report 
Secretary of the Navy 
Situation Report 









Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement 
Third Party Collection 
Third Party Collection Program 
United States Army 
United States Air Force 





I would like to thank both my Thesis Advisor, Dr. Richard Doyle, and Associate 
Advisor, CAPT Steven Lamar, MSC, USN (Ret) for their assistance and guidance 
throughout the thesis process. I also want to thank the following individuals who helped 
me gather data and/or provided personal interviews: CAPT James Scaramozzino, 
CDR Virginia Leibold, Ms. Lisa Sullivan, LCDR Scott Foster, LT Lorraine Nudd, and 
COL Paul Frederick. 
I would like to give a special thanks to Mrs. Vinta Shumway, who helped me 
gather the preliminary literature for this effort and provided proofreading service. In 
addition, I wish to thank my wife and children for their untiring support, understanding, 





This thesis will evaluate the capitation-based resource allocation model adopted by 
the Department ofDefense (DoD) and implemented within the Military. Health Services 
System (MHSS). It will also examine how this model has evolved and its impact on 
resource managers at the Navy's medical treatment facility (MTF). Discussions will also 
include the capitation-based financing system used in the private sector, and the incentives, 
major advantages and disadvantages associated with a capitation payment mechanism. 
This study concludes with a discussion of the major obstacles, problems, and 
implementation issues in implementing a capitation-based financing system within the 
MHSS. 
B. BACKGROUND 
It is well known that in the past ten years health care costs in the United States 
have risen at an alarming rate. Although inflation was experienced by American industry 
in general, health care and related service costs were, and remain, excessive compared to 
the overall economy (Iglehart, 1995, p. 3). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
reports that federal spending for health care as a percentage of total federal spending has 
increased from approximately 11 percent in 1980 to about 17 percent in 1993 (CBO, 10 
May 1993). CBO also noted that inflation in the U.S. health care sector has risen by 7.9 
percent a year from 1982 to 1991. This is almost twice the rate of growth in the overall 
Consumer Price Index during that period (4.1 percent) (CBO, 1993, p. 10). 
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During this same period, spending for the Military Health Services System 
(MHSS) also rose rapidly, requiring an increasing portion of the Department ofDefense 
(DoD) budget (GAO, 22 March 1995). Military health care spending (including 
CHAMPUS) went from approximately $4 billion in FY81 to about $14.5 billion in FY93 
(CBO, 10 May 1993). At the same time, the military is facing unprecedented challenges in 
managing reduced resources. Department ofDefense spending declined 39 percent in real 
terms between 1985 and 1997 (Congressional Research Service, 22 August 1996). 
The :MHSS is one of the nation's largest health care systems, offering health care 
benefits to about 8.3 million people and costing more than $15 billion annually. The 
primary mission of the :MHS S is to maintain readiness by providing for the health care of 
approximately 1. 7 million active-duty service personnel and by being prepared to deliver 
health care during times of war. Simultaneously, there are approximately 6.6 million non-
active-duty beneficiaries who receive health care through the :MHSS, 29 percent of which 
are active duty families and 50 percent are military retirees and their families (GAO, 22 
March 1995). 
The Military Medical Departments have traditionally programmed and budgeted 
for health programs using historical consumption and workload trends. However, for the 
past ten years the :MHSS has been under close scrutiny and extensive restructuring 
because of rapidly rising costs and limited budgets. Real and forecasted changes within 
the :MHSS have created a need to transition from a disease-based, workload measure to a 
modified capitation-based methodology. (GAO, 22 March 1995) 
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DoD adopted a modified capitation-based methodology in FY94 for resourcing the 
MHSS. This change is directed primarily by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)), as a strategy for containing the cost of health 
care. Subsequently, the Military Medical Departments have developed their own Service-
specific methodologies to re-allocate resources by capitation to the catchment area level. 
At a minimum, the methodology, or methodologies, must address total cost, including 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Direct Care, O&M CHAMPUS, Military Personnel 
(MILPERS), and a defined population ofbeneficiaries. (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 
July 1993) 
For OASD(HA), hereafter referred to as Health Affairs, the number of estimated 
"users" determines population instead of eligible beneficiaries. The three Services, 
however, in formulating their service unique capitation methodology, used "eligible" 
beneficiaries instead of actual users in allocating DHP funds to help their MTFs transition 
to a capitated system (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 July 1993). 
Under this capitation system, the local commander of each MTF assumes 
responsibility for providing health services to a defined population, for a fixed amount per 
beneficiary. In this approach, regardless of the amount of services used, there is no 
financial incentive to inappropriately increase the number of services or to provide more 
costly care than is clinically appropriate. A capitation-based resource allocation model is 
designed to discourage inappropriate admissions, unnecessarily long lengths of stay, and 
unwarranted services. 
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To be successful and effective in implementing a capitated payment mechanism, 
private sector HM:Os require enrollment of their beneficiaries. Another key ingredient in 
the successful implementation of a capitation-based payment system is improved and 
integrated resource data. Since "closed enrollment" was not feasible for the MHSS, and a 
sophisticated management information system to support capitation was not yet available, 
Health Affairs, in concert with the Services, developed and adopted a modified financial-
based capitation model for use in determining resource allocation to the MHSS. 
This modified capitation model is a population-driven methodology that accounts 
for unique military, medical-related functions. The model has three major categories: 
(1) Military Medical Support, (2) Military Unique Capitation, and (3) Medical Capitated 
Cost (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 July 1993). It has been further adapted to 
incorporate some of the concepts of managed care. The central idea of managed care is to 
use capitation as one of its approaches to containing costs while assuming accessibility and 
high quality of health care services. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question that this thesis endeavors to answer is: How does the 
Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery (BUMED) implement a capitation-based resource 
allocation concept, and how is this model being employed to shape budget development at 
the activity level? To answer the primary question, five subsidiary research questions will 
be addressed: 
4 
• What are the origins and purpose of capitation-based resource allocation? 
• Why and when did the DoD adopt a capitation-based approach to financing the 
MHSS? 
• What are the major obstacles to the adoption of a capitation-based approach 
within the MHSS, and how is DoD addressing these obstacles? 
• What is the capitation-based resource allocation model adopted by BUMED 
and how has it changed its budgeting process to meet specific issues affecting 
Navy medicine? 
• What are the implications of a capitation-based resource allocation model for 
resource managers at the activity level (i.e., Naval Medical Center, San Diego, 
California and Naval Hospital, Corpus Christi, Texas)? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will consist of an examination of the capitation-based resource 
allocation model as currently employed by Health Affairs and the Department of the Navy. 
It includes the relevant historical and background information, the information systems 
supporting capitation, and the specific calculations used in the determination of major 
capitation categories and capitated rates. It also notes the evolution of DoD's capitation-
based resource allocation model and discusses its impact on resource managers at the 
activity level. 
In addition, this research will evaluate BUMED' s approach to a capitation-based 
budgeting system. Understanding the methodology employed by BUMED requires an 
examination of the major obstacles involved in adopting and implementing a capitation-
based resource allocation model, the impact of a capitation-based budgeting system on 
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Navy MTF commanders and resource managers, and other issues involved in 
implementing a capitated financing system. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is limited to an examination of the experiences ofHealth Affairs and 
BUMED in implementing a capitation-based resource allocation model between FY94 and 
FY 96. Changes to the model or to the capitated formula after 31 October 1996 are not 
addressed. Nor are the capitation models employed by the Air Force and Army discussed 
in much detail. To evaluate the impact of a capitation-based resource allocation model at 
the MTF level, the researcher will conduct personal interviews with the Comptroller of 
Naval Medical Center, San Diego, California and Naval Hospital, Corpus Christi, Texas. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will rely primarily on a deductive approach to the question of how 
Health Affairs and BUMED's capitation-based resource allocation system has evolved and 
its impact on resource management at the activity level. Working papers, publications, 
and memoranda from DoD, Health Affairs, and BUMED were reviewed for areas relating 
to capitation-based resourcing and managed care. A review of the literature, including 
studies conducted by professional organizations and journal articles, were also used. This 
provided background data on practices and policies. Also, key personnel involved in 
capitation from Health Affairs, BUMED and at the MTF level were interviewed to gain 
additional insight and perspectives into the current policies. 
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G. DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 
Definitions of certain terms used in the thesis are given as they arise. A list of 
abbreviations and acronyms is presented after the Table of Contents. 
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I provides a general introduction to the concept of a capitation-based 
resource allocation model, followed by five chapters. Chapter IT provides an overview of 
the managed care in the private sector, the different types of managed care organizations, 
and various elements of a managed care network. Next, the concept of capitation is 
defined. Then, the salient characteristics, major advantages and disadvantages, and 
potential problems of a capitation-based financing system are analyzed. 
Chapter ill provides an overview of the MHSS direct care system and the 
TRICARE uniform benefit. Subsequently, the capitation model used by Health Affairs is 
examined. Chapter IV compares BUMED's capitation model with the model that is used 
by Health Affairs. It provides an overview of the different information systems available 
to support the implementation of a capitation-based resource allocation system within the 
MHSS. The last section in this chapter addresses the "readiness-focused" capitation. 
Developed by budget programmers from the Medical Finance Division, Office of the 
Surgeon General (N-931 ), this is a proposed alternative approach to programming and 
budgeting DHP resources in the development ofPOM-98. 
Chapter V presents analysis and major findings of the different obstacles in 
implementing a capitation-based financing system within the MHSS and examines how 
DoD is confronting these issues. It then addresses the typical incentives available to MTF 
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commanders under a capitation-based budgeting system. It also examines the impact of 
capitation on resource managers on the MTF level. 
Chapter VI concludes this thesis with a summary, conclusions, and discusses 
directions for future research. 
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II. CAPITATION BUDGETING IN THE CIVILIAN MANAGED 
CARE ENVIRONMENT 
Capitation has become an increasingly popular strategy for containing the costs of 
health care. Before discussing capitation budgeting, a managed care competition 
framework and its practices must be identified. This chapter will provide a brief review 
of the civilian managed care concept. 
The first section provides a definition of managed care and a description of the 
different types of managed health care organizations. In addition, this section includes a 
brief examination of various activities that led to the growth of managed care and 
highlights the characteristics of the most common forms of managed care. 
Subsequent sections will review the literature on the theory of capitation and the 
incentives and disincentives it creates in the marketplace. They will also address the 
salient characteristics of capitation and identify the advantages, disadvantages, and 
common problems of a capitation-based resource allocation system. 
A. MANAGED HEALTH CARE 
The American health care system operates on a commodity and commerce basis, 
in a marketplace that does not respond to classic market principles of supply, demand, 
price, or quality. This system includes unaffordable insurance packages and services 
characterized by good intentions, overindulgence, and self-interest (Y'/olford, et al, 1993, 
p. 7). 
In the past two decades, increased demand for improved health care combined 
with sharply rising costs have made health care a critical economic issue for health care 
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consumers and suppliers, employers, private health insurers, and public agencies 
(Hailstones, 1991, p. 242). In the early 1970's, the concept of managed care was 
introduced as the magic pill to cure the growing health care cost problem. Widespread 
support for managed health care services was based on the belief that it would benefit all 
three parties in the health services transaction: providers, payers, and patients (Iglehart, 
1992, p. 96). 
1. Definition 
"Managed Care" is a system of health care delivery that influences the utilization 
of services, costs of services, and measures performance (Flores, 1987, p. 10). The 
American Medical Association refers to managed care as a broad and constantly 
changing array of health plans, which attempt to control the cost and quality of care by 
coordinating medical and other health-related services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 11). 
A simplistic, but useful concept regarding managed care is the continuum. On 
one end of the continuum is managed indemnity with simple precertification of elective 
admissions and large case management of catastrophic cases, superimposed on a 
traditional indemnity insurance plan. Further along the continuum are Preferred Provider 
Organizations, open panel HM:Os (i.e., Independent Practice Associations), and finally 
closed panel HM:Os (i.e., group and staff model). As the system progresses from one end 
of the continuum to the other, it adds new and greater elements of control and 
accountability. Consequently, it tends to increase both the complexity and the overhead 
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required to operate the plan, but the system has a potential to achieve greater potential 
control of cost and quality (K.ongstvedt, 1993, p. 13). 
Managed care plans are designed to control the finance and delivery of health 
services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 16). They also provide financial protection against the 
burdens of catastrophic illness which precludes most, if not all, of the economic 
uncertainty resulting from major, unanticipated medical expenses. This protection is not 
usually included in standard insurance programs; it is only acquired at additional 
expense by purchasing additional coverage often referred to as "major medical" care 
(MacLeod, 1993, p. 3). Accordingly, one can conclude that the managed care strategy 
seeks to improve resource utilization by changing attitudes so that everyone, including 
the health care providers, pursues or provides cost-effective care. 
While there is no single definition of the term "managed care," most authors 
include the following six features: 
(1) Channeling patient to high-quality, efficient providers; 
(2) Creating reimbursement systems where physicians and hospitals are 
accountable for the cost and quality of medical services; 
(3) Monitoring and analyzing medical practice patterns; 
( 4) Establishing quality assurance programs; 
( 5) Designating Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) and catastrophic case managers; 
(6) Installing rigorous utilization management components (Luft, 1990, p. 5). 
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2. Growth and Development 
According to Kongstvedt, managed medical care is strictly an outgrowth of the 
private sector, dating back some 60 years (Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 3). The emergence of 
managed care is due largely to a realization by health care strategists that the American 
culture does not allow for effective policing of the use of health care services, either by 
health care consumers as a group, or by health care providers (Dufresne, 1995, p. 1). The 
major objectives of these efforts (both by private and public payers who are responsible 
for financing health care benefits programs and by individual consumers) are containing 
health care expenditures and ensuring appropriate utilization and high-quality care. 
In the late 1960's, accelerating health care costs and the trend toward high 
technology medicine fostered a radical change in financing health care. To combat 
increasing health care costs, the federal government in 1965 promoted the 
"corporatization" of health care systems, both in investor-owned and not-for-profit 
companies, through the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid legislation (MacLeod, 
1995, p. 4). Though it was not readily recognized, this new law laid the groundwork for 
significant controls (diagnosis-related groups, commonly known as DRGs and 
prospective pricing ) on the financing and payment for medical care services later to be 
imposed on physicians, hospitals and patients. 
Further federal involvement in the corporatization of medical care resulted in the 
passage of the HMO Act of 1973. Its ensuing amendments allowed managed medical 
care plans to increase in numbers and to expand their enrollment to beneficiaries of 
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government financed health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid among others 
(Macleod, 1995, p. 5). Also, in the 1970s, so-called prepaid group and solo practice 
plans were recast into a popular marketable entity called a "Health Maintenance 
Organization" (HMO). The development of the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
occurred later in the same decade (Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 5). 
Both prepaid group and individual practice plans were the opening wedges for a 
new kind of health care delivery in the United States. In these programs, physicians 
shared the risk of financing health care for an enrolled population and had a choice. 
between billing and collecting a fee-for-service from the patient or having the HMO pay 
the physician directly out of a prepaid per capita payment (capitation) for the health care 
services. These models led to widespread distribution of managed care plans in which 
HMOS assumed responsibility for providing a comprehensive range of health services to 
voluntarily enrolled populations at a fixed annual premium. 
The evolution of these pioneer prepaid group and individual practice plans in the 
private sector was one of the most extraordinary developments in the history of medical 
care organization in the world (Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 6). Prepaid plans went on to serve 
as a template for financing and organizing health care services for the American people. 
At the very least, the development ofHMOs and PPOs ushered in a new era of corporate 
influence into the practice of medicine (Shouldice, 1993, p. 18). 
A major factor in the overall success ofHMOs was the willingness of physicians 
to accept financial risk in providing health and medical care services to groups of 
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subscribers. If HMO physicians incurred expenses exceeding budgeted costs, part or the 
entire shortfall would have to be absorbed by the physicians. On the other hand, 
physicians could share any excess in revenues over expenditures. In addition, enrollees 
achieved considerable savings in health insurance premiums mainly by reduction in the 
number of unnecessary hospital admissions and length of hospital stays. 
Then, in the early 1980s, as health care spending continued to escalate, the federal 
and state governments pursued alternative measures aimed at reducing hospital 
expenditures by direct utilization controls and reimbursement limitations. Government-
mandated payments by diagnosis (Medicare) and payments per diem (Medi-Cal) were 
enacted. These efforts went through several developmental stages: first, benefit 
packages were redesigned to encourage cost-effective use of health care services; then 
the cost and utilization of services were closely monitored; and finally, managed care 
alternatives were used (Schroer, 1987, p. 3). 
In the private sector, there has been a dramatic increase in both horizontal and 
vertical integration of hospital systems. Some 40 percent of the nation's community 
hospitals are operated as multi-hospital systems. In addition, both not-for-profit and 
investor-owned companies are involved in a variety of health care markets, including 
long-term care, wellness programs and HMOs (Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 7). Employers have 
assumed more of the risk through self-insuring benefits programs and by increasing their 
direct links to providers through negotiated direct contracts (Schroer, 1987, p. 4). 
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The significant shift toward managed care during the 1980s by the government 
and private sector was designed to limit health care cost increases. This was 
accomplished primarily by shifting expenses to employees through higher employee 
premium contributions, higher deductibles and coinsurance arrangements. These efforts 
to combine the delivery and financing of health care services often resulted in decreased 
hospital admission, decreased average lengths of stay, and stabilized use of ancillary 
services. 
In recent years, the trend toward cost-shifting has slackened, largely because 
organizations sense that they have reached the limit of the expense which can be 
reasonably transferred to employees (Dufresne, 1995, p. 1). Most managed health care 
plans now pay more attention to price and patient satisfaction. Some managed health 
care plans now permit payment to nonparticipating physicians at the point of service. 
Under this agreement, the patient is responsible (a) in IPAs or PPOs for charges by 
nonparticipating physicians beyond that allowed by a fee schedule or (b) in a group or 
staff model HMO for direct payment to nonparticipants until a substantial deductible is 
met (Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 12). 
According to the American Hospital Association, the present form of managed 
care delivery system is an organized body of health services and financial mechanisms. 
They operate in an integrated and systematic fashion to manage and provide the right 
wellness, medical, and related services at the right place and time (Woolford, et al, 1995, 
p. 13). In essence, the system's organizational goal is to improve the long-term health 
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status of the community. Moreover, the ideal organization is designed to function as a 
seamless system of services (Wallack, 1995, p. 27). 
In addition, as pointed out by Kolb & Horowitz, the ideal managed care 
organization provides continuous improvement in delivery processes, avoidance of 
medical duplication, and containment of costs. Incentives for the present managed care 
organization exist to optimize the system as compared to optimizing the individual parts 
(Kolb & Horowitz, 1995, p. 67). 
3. A Continuum of Models 
Managed care programs are identified most often as Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs ), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs ), or any of a number of 
hybrids among these products. The managed care industry has spawned a large number 
of acronyms to describe its distinctive organizations; many people have described these 
acronyms as a confusing alphabet soup ofinitials. Nevertheless, knowledge of a few key 
acronyms makes an understanding of the managed care environment easier. For a 
complete description of other hybrid forms ofHMOs, refer to Appendix A. Following is 
a summary of the most common forms of managed care: 
a. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) 
HMOs are where the concept of a primary care physician, or gatekeeper 
firmly took hold. They typically take three forms: (1) the staff model; (2) The group 
model; and (3) the independent organization/association (IPOIIP A). 
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In the staff model, the HMO operates with the facility, and the physicians 
are HMO employees who have no private practice and are usually paid a salary. In the 
group model, the HMO contracts with a freestanding medical group of physicians who 
may continue to treat their private fee-for-service patients. The medical group is usually 
compensated on a capitation basis, with individual physicians' compensation determined 
by the medical group. Under an IPOIIP A, doctors operate on a fee-reduced, fee-for-
service basis or on a per capita basis. The HMO group with a legal entity represents 
individual physicians. The legal entity, in turn, contracts with the individual physicians. 
The HMO usually pays the IP AIIPO on a capitation basis, and the IP AIIPO pays its 
physician members (Rahn, 1995, p. 7). 
In all cases, the physicians contract independently with the network. 
Regardless of the HMO use, the main aspect is that one physician is given primary 
responsibility for an individual's care throughout the entire system. 
b. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
The PPO first appeared in the medical marketplace in the late 1970s. 
PPOs are included under the umbrella of managed care, but they do not offer a higher 
level of care management because the gatekeeper concept is not present. PPOs bring 
together networks of care providers to offer discounted fees for their services to an 
employer or group of employers in exchange for a higher volume of business 
(Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 14). One advantage of this managed care model is usually a 15 to 
17 
20 percent discount from what competitors charge to enrollees who agree to use the 
services of selected sets of physicians and hospitals. 
Under a PPO structure, no one directs the individual through the system, 
and patients are free to move at will from specialist to specialist or provider to provider. 
Thus, PPOs do not overcome the basic problem of health care users who make unsound 
judgments for themselves about the need for tests, visits to specialists, hospitalization, 
and so on. When individuals move from one physician to another in an uncoordinated or 
unmanaged fashion, the likelihood is greater that each physician will do his or her own 
testing, even if that testing has already been performed elsewhere, thus adding significant 
dollars to the cost of any health care system. However, unlike HMOs, PPOs reimburse 
the patient for covered services obtained from any provider at the discounted rate set for 
preferred providers. The patient then has to pay out-of-pocket the balance between the 
scheduled fee and the billed amount. 
c. Point-of-service (POS) plans 
POS plans represent a relatively new type of managed care program. The 
POS incorporates the features of a tightly managed HMO with those of a fee-for-service 
indemnity program. The POS concept aims to retain freedom of choice for patients, 
which clearly has surfaced as a key issue for employers, while still allowing employers to 
maintain quality coverage and manage costs. This is accomplished with an economic 
incentive that encourages employees through lower out-of-pocket costs to obtain care 
through the core HMO-style network (K.ongstvedt, 1993, p. 8). At the same time, 
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employees are not restricted, administratively or through excessive financial penalties, 
from going "out of network" to obtain care from the doctor or facility of their choice if 
they feel uncomfortable with any aspect of the care provided through the core network 
(Dufresne, 1995, p. 6). 
This form of health benefit coverage represents an attractive managed care 
option for many employers and their covered employees, particularly when the employer 
is using POS as a consolidation of existing indemnity coverage and multiple HMOs in 
the group. However, a successful implementation of a POS plan hinges on educating and 
assuring employees and their family members that most of their needs can be satisfied 
effectively through the "in-network" or HMO side of the plan. Traditional HMOs may 
offer similar benefit options through an out-of-plan benefit rider or POS option. 
d. Hybrid of Health Care Alternatives 
Appendix A provides a detailed description of hybrid forms of managed 
care. These forms of managed care contain a hybrid of features characteristic of 
traditional health care plan designs. Options at the plan designer's disposal include 
freedom of choice (characteristic of traditional indemnity plans), negotiated discounts 
(characteristic ofPPOs ), and a focus on wellness, utilization reviews and the gatekeeper 
concept (characteristic ofHMOs ). The degree to which managed care plan designers mix 
and match these features will determine the extent to which costs and utilization can be 
managed through the new hybrid plan. 
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A POS plan represents a "middle of the road" hybrid because it seeks to 
manage costs while giving users a sense that their choices for care are not being 
restricted. These hybrid health care alternative plans have been designed to offer 
economic incentives to users to encourage them to stay in the network. At the same time, 
participants have an opportunity to make their own choices about where to procure care, 
with the understanding that there may be additional costs when that choice is exercised. 
4. Elements of a Managed Care Network 
As Figure 1 shows, development of an effective health care network involves the 
balancing of four major factors: access to care; quality of services and outcomes; 
utilization of management; and risk sharing. 
Figure 1: Four Key Elements of a Managed Care Network1 
1Source: Dufresne, M. R., Evaluating Managed Care 
Network, p.lO, 1995. 
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a. Access to Care 
According to Dufresne, a key objective when considering access to care 
should not be to provide a huge selection of physicians. Rather, the emphasis should be 
on constructing a network of qualified physicians distributed across a reasonable 
geographic area (Dufresne, 1995, p. 10). 
"Access" to most Americans means total freedom to go anywhere in the 
marketplace, and a managed care network is often viewed as a major restriction of this 
freedom (Hailstones, 1991, p. 242). As noted by Shouldice, one way to alleviate the 
user's perceived restriction in a managed health care network is to ensure an appropriate 
mix of provider types and a sufficient selection among primary care practices that are 
"open" and available to accept new patients (Shouldice, 1991, p. 114). Nothing can be 
more detrimental and frustrating to a consumer newly accepted into a network than 
discovering in the directory that most physician listings are stamped "practice not 
available to new patients." 
Another important aspect of access, as pointed out by Dufresne, is 
requiring the network to meet specified standards for delivery of service. The primary 
care physician should provide 24-hour coverage, seven days a week, and sufficient 
procedures should be in place for obtaining backup service or quick response to messages 
when the primary care doctor cannot be reached directly (Dufresne, 1995, p. 12). 
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b. Quality Services and Outcomes 
Dowling defines quality as the provider's ability to successfully correct, 
cure or otherwise improve the medical condition that has initiated the need for care. In 
his description of quality, he admits that it can be highly subjective (Dowling 1990, p. 
61). For example, some people feel that the most important aspect of a provider's quality 
is bedside manner or personality. Others look for speed in which a problem is attended 
to and corrected. 
Though it is difficult to quantify the quality of medical care, it is critical 
that a network be structured so that "report cards" can be issued consistently for the 
network as a whole and for the individual physicians, hospitals and other facilities within 
the network (Eastaugh, 1992, p. 85). Also, continued efforts must be made regarding the 
measurements needed to monitor a network's effectiveness properly, and the steps needed 
to obtain those measurements accurately and consistently (Dufresne, 1995, p. 12). 
c. Utilization Management 
A network should have an administrative arm that actively maintains, 
monitors and controls utilization practices and procedures. Though physicians should 
have the freedom to deliver quality care, it is also important that checkpoints be in place 
to guard against unnecessary hospitalizations, extended stays and other excesses 
(Dufresne, 1995, p. 14). 
According to Kongstvedt, another key focus to managing utilization is to 
ensure that excessive administrative overhead at provider locations or for the network as 
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a whole, does not negate the lower cost levels realized through alternative procedures 
(Kongstvedt, 1991, p. 115). Otherwise, costs will merely be shifted from one side of the 
equation to the other. 
d. Risk-sharing 
The objective of risk-sharing is to share risks equally among all the parties 
involved in a managed care approach: the provider, patients, and the employer which is 
supplying a large portion of the benefit coverage (Eastaugh, 1992, p. 85). Much of this 
division of risk is accomplished through plan design and the various weights assigned to 
deductibles, copayments and other payment features (Kongstvedt, 1991, p. 126). 
Risk also comes into play when a network is being established and 
providers are being selected. Providers must be brought into the network with the 
understanding that they will be rewarded for operating within controlled limits of 
utilization and penalized if they failed to meet established standards (Starr, 1995, p. 30). 
As Starr suggested, the risk-sharing aspects of managed care often serve as an incentive 
plan for the physician. Providers may receive reimbursements through a discounted fee-
for-service arrangement or a per capita rate for the year, depending on how contracts are 
negotiated (p. 32). 
Managed care is moving providers to an arena in which they can be 
assured of receiving a base level of income and can also receive an opportunity to 
supplement their income through incentive programs in return for providing quality care 
in a low-cost environment. This arrangement puts a premium on the physician making 
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proper, cost-efficient judgments when determining the type of care required (Rosentein, 
1993, p. 179). 
For example, if a primary care physician is receiving $100 a year per 
patient, $80 per patient would be received up front or through an installment (capitation) 
payment. The physician then would be responsible for providing care for each patient on 
an as-needed basis, with the knowledge that his or her utilization performance would be 
reviewed at year-end. If the physician is successful in keeping patients healthy while 
providing most of the care without resorting to referrals, much of the basic fee and 
subsequent withhold payments would be returned as net profit. If the physician 
unnecessarily refers patient to specialists for every situation and compounds the cost of 
care by referring those patients to out-of-network specialists, the review process would 
likely deem it necessary to: (1) eliminate or substantially reduce the withhold payment; 
(2) institute counseling or educational processes with the physicians; or (3) remove the 
physician from the network in cases where performance continues to lag below 
established standards (Jaklevic, 1994, p. 24). 
5. Summary 
The recent growth and development of managed medical care involving 
ambulatory medical care, hospitalization, and health insurance has created a variety of 
complex organizations requiring the finest management skills available. Managed care in 
its existing and likely emulated formats means many things, including the micro-
managing of consumer choice, consumer selection of providers, and providers' use of 
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procedures, diagnosis and treatment. Coupled with this new set of micro-management 
tools are a myriad of financial strategies and incentives presumed to alter the behavior of 
physicians, hospitals, and other providers. 
Health care providers must be structured and managed in a way that recognizes 
·provider accountability and rewards efficiency, quality, and value. If this restructuring is 
to happen, the distance between buyers and providers must be shortened to make 
providers more direct sellers with nothing between them and the buyer to alter incentives 
for efficiency (Rahn, 1995, p. 48). 
Currently, managed care organizations in the U.S. continue to grapple with the 
process of extensive restructuring and reengineering of the health care delivery system. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this change is fueled primarily by 
employers who need to cut yearly double digit increases in expenditures for employee 
health care benefits. This reform movement has been underway for over a decade now. 
It has manifested itself through HM:Os and other types of "managed care" health care 
delivery plans (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1995, p. 274). However, the way providers 
are being compensated for services under these plans is changing rapidly. Instead of the 
traditional fee-for-service, where providers are paid a fee for each service rendered, 
payers are assigning patients to providers and pre-paying them a flat monthly fee for 
providing care. This practice is called "capitation." 
25 
B. CAPITATION 
A capitation-based resource allocation system is increasingly advocated as a 
budgeting strategy to consolidate resources, develop services, focus responsibility, and 
manage care appropriately. This depiction of capitation budgeting will be the foundation 
for discussing capitation in both the private sector and the Military Health care Services 
System (MHSS). 
1. Definition 
Basically, "capitation" can be defined as a prospective (health care) 
reimbursement process, in which prepayment on a per capita, fixed-fee basis is employed 
without regard to utilization (Enthoven, 1993, p. 6). As described earlier, capitation is a 
payment mechanism in which health care providers are paid a fixed fee per month per 
enrolled member to cover comprehensive services over a period of time. Providers agree 
to provide services for this fixed, predetermined payment regardless of how many times 
the member uses the service (Halvorson, 1993, p. 15). 
Also, capitation establishes certain benefits, risks, incentives, and innovations, as 
well as different rate setting techniques to determine the per capita rate (Aiken, 1989, 
p. 8). Under this definition, capitation has three crucial elements: 
(1) Care is prepaid with a predetermined, agreed-upon price, and does not vary 
according to the value or intensity of services; 
(2) The payment is tied to specific capitated patients, typically through some 
type of an enrollment system; and 
(3) The provider bears full financial risk if expenditures exceed payments. (p. 9) 
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Combined, these elements give the provider a strong incentive to manage care 
wisely since he keeps part, if not all, of the savings when the medical costs are within the 
capitated payment (Schroer, 1987, p. 127). 
2. Objectives and Theory 
In the literature, there is a general agreement about the objectives of capitation-
based budgeting. Without exception, cost containment is reported as the major goal. The 
success ofHMOs in achieving this objective as compared to traditional delivery systems 
is well documented. However, according to Cave, cost containment does not imply 
complete cessation of cost growth. Rather, the reference is to the achievement of 
operational efficiencies that will ensure organizational health care costs do not rise at a 
rate faster than that dictated by the growth in the enrolled (or catchment) population and 
the economy (Cave, 1994, p. 15). In the macro sense, we mean that health care costs 
should not exceed some target portion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
How is the objective of cost containment achieved? First, capitation addresses 
the consumption of all health care resources. This implies that in order to achieve the 
stated objective, all resources must be considered in the capitation process and separate, 
isolated budgets cannot be permitted (Kay, 1990, p. 90). 
Second, the mixing of resources to optimize their use implies that cost-effective 
trade-offs (for example capital-labor substitution) are employed for the most efficient and 
effective achievement of the goals of the organization, given extant resource constraints. 
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Total cost management should be the overriding goal; consequently, the days of profit 
centers are probably numbered. 
Third, "local optimization" infers that "cost-effective trade-offs" will be 
accomplished at the operational or provider level (Kay, 1992, p. 92). Therefore, 
capitation is a decentralized approach to resource allocation and reinforces the notion that 
physicians act as the central decision-makers concerning the delivery of hospital care. 
3. Characteristics 
Since a capitation-based financing system is subject to a variety of diverse 
applications, no attempt to identify features peculiar to every conceivable health care 
setting or method of employment will be attempted in this paper; only those 
characteristics of a general nature will be examined. As noted by Anthony and 
Herzlinger in their discussion of non-profit organizations, the effect of characteristics on 
the overall process will vary in degree; therefore they will more appropriately represent 
tendencies rather than pervasive, omnipresent characteristics (Anthony & Herzlinger, 
1990, p. 13). 
As mentioned earlier, capitation is a payment mechanism in which health care 
providers are paid a fixed fee per month per enrolled member to cover comprehensive 
services over a period of time. Providers agree to provide services for this fixed 
predetermined payment regardless of how many times the member uses the service 
(Halvorson, 1993, p. 15). To fully understand if capitation budgeting will provide the 
incentives for cost-effective care in the Military Health Services System (MHSS), certain 
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characteristics, such as benefits, risks, incentives, and innovations, as well as different 
rate setting techniques to determine the per capita rate must be examined. 
a. Benefits 
A capitation payment arrangement can be an effective means of 
controlling health care costs because it allows both the insurer and the employer to 
predict costs for health care services more accurately. Recognizing the economic and 
strategic implications ofbetter managing costly components of health care, financial 
managers in hospitals and HMOs seek to adopt a capitated payments mechanism. 
According to Feldstein, the following are typical benefits of a capitated system: 
(1) Incentives for hospital efficiency 
(2) Less duplication of services 
(3) Reduced cost of a medical treatment 
( 4) Increased physician productivity 
( 5) Incentive for preventive care and health education 
( 6) Innovation in health care delivery 
(7) Enhanced relationships among provider organizations. (Feldstein, 1988, 21) 
b. Risk Sharing 
"Risk" is defined as the expected value of the distribution of per capita 
costs of efficiently-provided preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic health care services 
delivered to a defined group of enrollees for a specific future period (Hornbrook and 
Goodman, 1991, p. 95). Risk also includes the opportunity for the provider to realize 
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profits by keeping the medical costs below the capitated payments. Thus, risk creates a 
financial stake for the health care provider in the health plan's operation because their 
compensation is based, to some degree, on their ability to hold services to an appropriate 
level and to economize on more expensive services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 213). 
A review of the literature on capitation suggests that managed care 
organizations and providers with capitation experience have used a variety of 
mechanisms for distributing financial risk. How much of the plan providers are allocated 
ranges on a continuum from full financial risk for all enrolled patients, to a mix of risk 
sharing for different services, to no risk (which is essentially cost-based reimbursement). 
According to Volpp, in a capitated model, the providers do not get paid to provide care; 
they get paid to assume the risk to provide care (Volpp, 1993, p. 8). 
c. Incentives 
In this discussion, "incentive" is defined as the means to motivate efficient 
hospital/health care management. Incentives also encourage physicians to decrease 
hospital utilization, use resources judiciously, and emphasize preventive health services 
(Shouldice, 1991, p. 100). Capitation offers no incentive to over-provide expensive 
medical care; instead it provides strong incentives toward preventive care (Kongstvedt, 
1989, p. 91). 
(1) Positive Incentives. According to Bloom, proponents of 
capitation claim that it introduces positive incentives into health care delivery systems. 
First, payment is generally made in advance, which allows delivery systems to engage in 
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long-term planning. Second, capitation consolidates funding resources, which may 
increase the resources available to a delivery system and increase the flexibility of 
providers in designing the service delivery system. Third, capitated payments provide 
incentives to treat high-risk, severely ill or otherwise difficult patients by tying payments 
to specific targeted groups. Fourth, capitation encourages delivery of cost-effective 
treatment, because care has to be provided with a fixed amount of money. Thus 
capitation is often used as a mechanism to shift the bulk of treatment provided from 
inpatient, hospital-based care to outpatient, community based care. Finally, capitation 
encourages providers to coordinate care (Bloom, 1994, p. 681). 
(2) Negative Incentives. Unfortunately, capitation also 
introduces incentives that can result in unwanted outcomes that may have negative 
effects if mechanisms to prevent them are not introduced. According to Bloom, one 
negative incentive is that, if clients are given their choice of providers, the providers may 
respond by attempting to attract clients who are not high-service users to their plans, in 
an effort to exclude high-cost clients-- a process known as "skimming." Second, 
providers may shift costs to other sectors of the health care delivery system or to 
programs that are not included in the capitated system. Third, providers may substitute 
less-qualified professional staff (who also are less costly) to provide care to patients 
enrolled in the capitated system. Finally, providers may under-serve patients in order to 
minimize expenditures (Bloom, 1994, p. 683). 
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d. Innovations 
(1) Information Technology. According to Bergman, "the 
institution's success in moving to a capitated environment depends on information 
technology success" (Bergman, 1994, p. 35). Since the primary care physician should be 
responsible for the total management of a patient's care, the medical group needs to have 
accurate information on the at-risk population. Capitated members need to be identified 
along with associated revenues and costs and summarized by the primary care physician 
for accurate profiling. Specialty encounters should be captured as well to profile the 
network specialists (Zaharias, 1995, p.6). 
Due to some innovative successes in information technology, 
health care managers and providers have readily available data needed for a capitation-
based financing system. " Leveraging data to more cost-effectively treat patients is 
today's new innovation" (Hamilton, 1995, p. 184). Hamilton states that providers are 
aiming to cut cost and improve care. The key is better information systems. These 
information systems include: eligibility and benefits determination, encounter processing, 
referral management, claims processing, case management, physician compensation, 
insurance management functions, outcomes reporting, performance management, and 
patient level cost accounting (Hamilton, 1995, p. 187). 
However, health information systems now in place may not be as 
robust or as well integrated as they should be. The ideal information system should 
provide readily available and accurate reports tailored to meet hospital administrators and 
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providers' needs. It is not enough to simply gather data; the system must be able to feed 
back the data to the specific end-user (physicians, department mangers, nurse, 
administrators,· etc.) And it should provide them with positive alternatives for care. 
(2) Incentive Pay. Incentive pay is by far the most popular 
mechanism to reward and motivate providers for preserving an organization's capitated 
payment (Montague, 1994, p. 20). Because capitated providers are organized in such 
various ways, it is not surprising that physician compensation mechanisms in these 
entities are incredibly varied as well. Capitated providers pay physicians using every 
method, from straight salaries to traditional fee-for-service payments (Montague, 1994, p. 
21). 
A capitated provider may also divide an overall capitated payment 
based on the equivalent fee-for-service billing of its physicians, or it may even contract to 
make fee-for-service payments to some outside physicians for care that cannot be 
provided in-house (Steams, Wolfe & Kindig, 1995, p. 416). So, physicians may receive 
part of their compensation as salary, part as an incentive payment, and part from a risk 
pool based on their billings, as well as other payments from other plans. According to 
Ogden, the differing compensation methods sometimes cause friction between 
physicians, which can be further exacerbated as longstanding informally referred patients 
are replaced by formal, in-house capitated patients (Ogden, 1991, p. 30). 
At Kaiser-Permanente Hospitals, they are experimenting in some 
areas with a merit pay system based on quality service, utilization, collegiality and other 
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factors (Ceme, 1994, p. 21). Anoth~r example comes from the Friendly Hills Medical 
Group. They established a bonus pool to reward the entire group, rather than individual 
departments, if the overall cost falls below the capitated target (Ceme, 1994, p. 23). 
(3) Patient Access System. Patients want to be ensured access to 
necessary services within the medical care system, particularly to a member of their 
primary care team. This may be accomplished through the use of "personal health 
management" or "decision support" (Jaklevic 1995, p. 19). One initiative some hospitals 
are employing is the use of telephone consultation. According to Jaklevic, just as the 
telephone was used to bring patients into the hospital, it is now being employed to keep 
patients at home. The goal is to allow patients to call trained and skilled nurses about 
health care treatments, procedures, health education, and other questions concerning their 
health status. These networks also offer callers over 430 audio tapes on various health 
topics. 
According to Zaharias, a patient access system may also be 
accomplished through the development of 
• Scheduling and staffing mix strategies that incorporate physician extenders and 
nursing triage/telephone consultation; 
• Paneling systems that assist members in selecting an appropriate primary care 
physician and support the patient/physician relationship. (Zaharias, 1995, p. 6) 
Although appointment availability is a critical component of 
access, it is also important that: 
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• The medical center be conveniently located and open during favorable hours 
and days; 
• Medical care is accessible when the medical center is closed; 
• The member has telephone access to the physician or a team member. 
(Zaharias, 1995, p. 8) 
The activities previously mentioned should be tracked and 
. monitored closely to ensure that patients have access to needed medical services. Access 
also entails providing a system that allows the users to get help in understanding the 
network process through written and oral communication both before and after care is 
provided. Consumers need to be assured that if they have a question, there is a customer 
service number they can call. Furthermore, they need to be assured that this number can 
always be reached and that answers can be obtained without having to hold for 10 or 15 
minutes. Finally, they must feel confident that the responses they receive will be correct 
and consistent. 
e. Rate Setting Methodology 
The ability to develop and use a base capitation rate which can be 
adjusted, as needed, for changes in the demographic makeup of the service population is 
one of the salient characteristics of capitation budgeting. According to Dowling, the 
capitation rate setting process is an ideal way in which to systematically influence the 
resource consumption patterns of both facilities and individual health care managers and 
providers. In order to achieve the potential this process suggests, it is necessary to 
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develop an objective. equitable. and efficient adjustment mechanism (to be used) in 
conjunction with the basic rate setting methodology to allocate the always insufficient 
total or central budget among the competing regions (facilities) (Dowling, 1991, p. 23). 
There are basically two premium rating methodologies for determining 
capitated rates: community rating and experience rating. 
(1) Community Rating. In 1981, the federal government passed 
legislation which expanded the definition of community rating and introduced the 
community rating class (CRC) system. According to Ceme, there are three steps 
involved in a community rating class: 
(1) Classify all HMO members into classes actuarially derived or based on 
factors that can predict differences in utilization of services; 
(2) Determine projected cost of each class, and calculate the revenue 
requirements for providing services to members of each class. 
(3) Ascertain the composite premium rate for all individuals in a class or group 
of similar size. (Ceme, 1994, p. 30) 
In defining community rated classes, the government allows four 
factors: age, sex, marital status and type of industry. CRC presupposes the availability 
of data to develop cost assumptions for each class. This system can be complicated and 
organizations desiring to implement this system are encouraged to seek professional 
assistance from a qualified person or firm with expertise in this area. 
(2) Experience Rating. Insurance companies and most Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield organizations use "Experience Rating" as the principal method for 
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determining rates (Kongstvedt, 1989, p. 43). This system takes into account previous 
experience gained by the insurer or health organization regarding the cost needed to 
provide care for its members. Rates are adjusted to this factor. The main difference 
between these two systems is that where the CRC determines rates prospectively, 
experience rating determines them retrospectively. 
C. PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGES 
The obvious advantage of a capitation-based resource allocation system is cost 
control, curbing the escalating dollars spent on health care in the United States. 
Capitation creates incentives for health care providers to contain costs. Health care 
providers increase their profits by practicing cost-effective medicine and coordinating 
and eliminating redundancies in services (Shouldice, 1991, p. 127). A capitation-based 
financing model also creates a predictable cash flow, eliminates the standard billing 
process and circumvents potential lengthy delays in claims payments. 
D. PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGES 
The primary disadvantage of a capitation-based resource allocation system is that 
the provider assumes full risk when the treatment required by a capitated patient exceeds 
the capitation amount. For some health care providers, this risk far outweighs the 
advantages (Shouldice, 1991, p. 129). A capitation-based budgeting financing model 
also places virtually all of the responsibility and rewards for effective management in the 
hands of the provider, who may not want all of the responsibility (Stearns, et al, 1992, p. 
423). Further, it reduces choice for patients. 
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E. POTEN~PROBLEMS 
Capitation theoretically rewards providers for not providing services. Under this 
premise, capitation-based budgeting could compel health care providers to become 
restrictive gatekeepers. Physicians will continually be forced into a series of moral stress 
tests, knowing that the consequences of doing good for a patient and ensuring quality 
care will either reduce their profits or limit the resources available to other patients. The 
physician-patient relationship could be undermined if patients feel that they cannot trust 
their physicians to act in their best interest (Shouldice, 1991, p. 131). 
Although physicians have the incentive to withhold treatment from patients and 
undermine quality care for financial gains under capitation-based financing systems, 
there are arguments to explain why this is not plausible. First, physicians as licensed 
practitioners are worried about their reputation as professionals. Second, there is 
incentive not to sacrifice quality of care because of the competition for subscribers 
among health care organizations in the medical field. 
Capitated managed care plans also instill quality programs. These programs are 
designed to determine a quality of care baseline and to develop and maintain programs to 
keep it at an acceptable level. They also institute improvements when the opportunity 
arises or the care does not meet standards (Slee, 1992, p. 120). 
Another common problem with capitation involves chance, such as when there 
are too few members in an enrolled base to make up for bad luck. Physicians with fewer 
than 100 members may find that the dice simply may roll against them, and they will 
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have members who need complex or specialized treatment, such as bypass surgery, 
chemotherapy, AIDS treatment, or a host of other expensive medical problems 
(Kongstvedt, 1993, p. 60). As suggested by Kongstvedt, one way to alleviate this 
problem is to spread the risk for expensive cases through common risk-sharing pools for 
referral and institutional expenses and to provide stop-loss or threshold protection for 
expensive cases (p. 61). 
One last issue, although it is not a problem per se, should be raised. In a capitated 
system, savings from decreased utilization may not result in direct savings to the plan. In 
other words, if primary care services undergo a reduction in utilization, the capitation 
payments will not go down, just as they will not go up when there is increased utilization. 
In essence, if a system uses capitation extensively for primary care, specialty care, and 
hospitalization, there may be no reduction in expenses even if controls result in a 
dramatic lowering of utilization rates. On the other hand, such reductions will result in 
less pressure to increase capitation rates the next year. 
F. SUMMARY 
Managed care programs in the private sector are identified most often as Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs ), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs ), or any 
hybrid among these products. The widespread support for managed care programs, 
especially HMOs, reflects the belief that all parties in health services transactions - -
providers, payers, and patients -- will benefit, through the provision of quality, cost-
efficient care. This chapter addressed the private sector's experience with capitation 
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budgeting under managed care, particularly the incentives to the various players and 
regarding quality of care. The conclusion is that the introduction of a capitation-based 
resource allocation system in the private sector does provide the incentives for the 
delivery of quality, cost-effective care. 
The following chapter will address managed care and capitation-based budgeting 
in the Military Health Services System (MHSS). It will also provide background on the 
military health care system, its structure and its beneficiaries. 
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ill. MANAGED CARE IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 
In order to fully understand the positive and negative effects capitation can have 
on military medicine, the military health service system (MHSS) must first be explained. 
The first section of this chapter will provide a conceptual framework of the military 
medical structure. The remaining sections will briefly describe the events that led to the 
implementation of a capitation-based resource allocation model in DoD and will discuss 
Health Affairs' capitation-based financing model. 
A. THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM (MHSS) 
The MHSS offers health care benefits to about nine million people and costs over 
$15 billion annually. In 1995, the medical budget represented about six percent of the 
total defense budget. Although the primary mission of the MHSS is to maintain the 
health of approximately 1. 7 million active-duty service personnel and to be prepared to 
deliver health care during times of war, it also provides services to some 6.6 million non-
active-duty beneficiaries. Health care services are delivered through an extensive system 
of military treatment facilities (MTFs) located throughout the world and through an 
insurance-like program called the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
Services (CHAMPUS) (GAO, March 1995). 
The Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)) is responsible for 
the planning, policy development, and oversight of the MHSS. These responsibilities 
include developing guidance on Department of Defense (DoD) health and plan programs; 
ensuring that medical programs and systems meet operational readiness requirements; 
establishing requirements and standards for DoD medical and acquisition programs; 
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programming and budgeting MHSS resources and funds, except personnel and 
construction funds; and administering CHAMPUS (GAO, March 1995). 
The MHSS is headed by the ASD (HA), however, each Service has its own 
medical department. Each medical department is headed by its own surgeon general, and 
prepares a medical program budget for Health Affairs, develops Service-specific 
programs, and operates the Services' MTFs. Each Service also recruits and funds its own 
medical personnel to administer the medical programs and provide health care services. 
Funding for the MHSS is provided through a single defense medical 
appropriations account, the Defense Health Program (DHP) Appropriation. The DHP 
provides the necessary resources for the delivery of medical and dental services to the 
active forces and other eligible beneficiaries. It provides funds for operations and 
maintenance, procurement, medical command headquarters, specialized services for 
training of medical personnel, occupational and industrial health care, and CHAMP US. 
The DHP also provides funding for the acquisition and expense of capital equipment in 
support of military MTFs, training, facilities, and programs, but does not include funds 
for military construction (funded through a separate account) and active and reserve 
medical personnel. Active duty medical pay is included in the DHP Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM), but is transferred to the Military Departments for budget execution 
(OASDIHA, March 1995). 
Health Affairs directs the distribution of funds to the Services, which then 
allocates the funds to their MTFs and other activities. Figure 2 depicts the flow of funds 
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from the DHP to Health Affairs, the Services' Medical Departments, and ultimately to the 
individual MTFs and other medical activities. 






Figure 2: Flow of Funds from DHP2 
1. The Direct Care System 
Secreta fAir Force 
Surgeo11 General 
MAJtOMs 
Active duty personnel and other eligible beneficiaries receive their health care 
services directly through an extensive system of DoD operated hospitals and clinics, 
staffed by civilian and military medical personnel. This delivery system has become 
known as the direct care system. Three-fourths of all health care services are provided 
2Source: Colonel D. Braendel, Organication for TRICARE, 
November 1996. 
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through the direct care system, while one-fourth is provided through CHAMJ»US. Active 
duty personnel and their family members make up about one-half of the eligible 
beneficiary population; the other half consists of retirees, their family members, and 
survivors (OASD/HA, March 1995). 
The combined MTF capabilities of all three Services include over 600 MTFs, 
composed of 127 military hospitals and over 500 clinics. The MTFs employ about 
48,000 civilians, along with 135,000 active duty military, and about 91,000 personnel in 
the Selected Reserves and National Guard assigned to medical missions (GAO, March 
1995). 
There are three categories ofMTFs: (1) Medical centers, which are large tertiary 
care facilities, ranging in size from about 200 to 1,000 beds, and offering both inpatient 
and outpatient care; (2) Community hospitals, typically with fewer than 200 beds, which 
offer inpatient and outpatient care but usually handle less complex cases than the medical 
centers; (3) Clinics, which are generally small facilities offering a limited range of 
primary care services and usually only on an outpatient basis (GAO, March 1995). 
Although fewer in number, the medical centers provide a larger portion of direct 
care. In 1992, about 57 percent of the inpatient workload and about 30 percent of the 
outpatient workload in the direct care system was handled in medical centers. 
Community hospitals handled about 43 percent of the direct care inpatient workload and 
about 60 percent of the outpatient workload. The remaining outpatient care was 
delivered in clinics (GAO, March 1995). 
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2. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMP US) 
CHAMPUS is a program of medical benefits provided by the U.S. government 
under public law. Legislative actions in 1956 and 19663 gave family members of active 
duty personnel, retirees and their family members and survivors access to care in MTFs 
on a space available basis. When health care services are not available in MTFs to non-
active-duty beneficiaries, these beneficiaries can receive health care from the private 
sector through CHAMPUS. Active duty members are not eligible to receive health care 
under the CHAMPUS Program, but they receive their health care services through the 
direct care system. 
CHAMPUS is automatically available to the families of active-duty personnel, 
retirees and their family members and survivors under the age of65. At age 65, 
beneficiaries are no longer eligible for CHAMPUS because they become eligible for 
Medicare. However, Medicare eligible beneficiaries may still receive care through the 
direct care system on a space-available basis. 
CHAMPUS is comparable to private sector indemnity (fee-for-service) health 
benefit plans, requiring beneficiaries to pay for care up to an annual deductible amount, 
and then pay a portion of the remaining costs. However, beneficiaries are not required to 
pay premiums for CHAMPUS. The amount of the deductible and copayment varies by 
type and source of health care and by different beneficiary groups, ranging from $50 to 
$600 for the deductible and 50 percent for cost-share of CHAMP US maximum allowable 
3Dependents' Medical Care Act (P.L. 84-569) in 1956, and the Military Medical 
Benefits Amendments of 1966 (P.L. 89-614). 
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charge (CMAC) when TRICARE Prime members opts for POS option and use TRICARE 
Standard services (Lamar, personal communication, November 1996). CHAMPUS 
eligibility, benefits and cost sharing are defined in Chapter 55 of Title 10, United States 
Code. 
To help ensure fuller utilization of the direct care system, CHAMPUS will not pay 
for private sector inpatient hospital care and some high cost outpatient care provided to 
beneficiaries living within a 40-mile radius of an MTF, unless those beneficiaries receive 
prior approval from the facility. This approval is called a "non-availability statement" and 
it tells the beneficiary that the MTF could not provide the necessary treatment within the 
required period or did not have the capability to provide the needed health care service. 
Beneficiaries living outside the 40-mile radius of the MTF are not required to obtain a 
non-availability statement. 
More than a third of the almost six million people who are eligible for CHAMPUS 
use its benefits annually at a government cost of nearly $3 billion. In FY 93, CHAMPUS 
expenditures were approximately $3.5 billion, nearly as much as was spent on nonactive 
duty beneficiaries in the direct care system ($3.9 billion) (GAO, March 1995). 
In an effort to control spiraling health care costs, CHAMPUS implemented several 
payment mechanisms for inpatient and acute care services. In 1987, CHAMPUS, 
following the model established by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) for 
the Medicare Prospective Payment System, has used the diagnosis-related group (DRG) 
to develop prospective payment rates for hospital care. Under this system, 
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CHAMPUS will pay hospitals a fixed fee per patient. In 1992, CHAMPUS began paying 
physicians based on national prevailing charges, adjusted to reflect local economic 
conditions using Medicare's Geographic Practice Cost Indices. Today, CHAMPUS 
payment levels for many procedures are at or near Medicare Fee Schedule amounts. In 
order to protect beneficiaries and avoid impairing access to care, the payment level 
reductions can be waived if they would impair access (OASDIHA, March 1995). 
Within the past ten years, several alternatives to the direct care system and 
CHAMPUS have been implemented to contain health care costs within the MHSS. The 
more familiar programs include: the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) 
demonstrations; Tidewater Virginia (Coordinated Care) demonstrations project; 
PRIMUS/NA VCARE Clinics; Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) site managed care 
initiatives; and the Managed Care Support Program contracts for California and Hawaii 
(Lamar, 1994, p. 4). 
The introduction of these health care reform initiatives can be attributed to ever 
increasing health care costs, growing numbers of military retirees and dependents, high 
medical inflation, and the problems inherent in the MHSS itself Historically, these 
problems included: uneven access to care; overcrowding in the MTFs; inefficient 
distribution of health care resources; duplication of effort among the military medical 
services; lack of a standardized health benefits package; decreased DoD funding levels; 
and beneficiary confusion concerning available health care options (CBO, April1994). 
Armed with the lessons earned from its previous health care initiatives and faced 
with escalating health care costs and reduced funding, Health Affairs has begun the 
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monumental task of redesigning the MHSS through a system-wide implementation of 
TRICARE's Triple Option Benefit Program, Capitation-based resource allocation and an 
Alternative Managed Care Support financing approach for Health Service Regions 1, 2, 
and 5. 
3. The TRICARE Program 
In December 1993, DoD submitted a plan to the Congress for establishing a 
managed care plan nationwide, referred to as TRICARE. The goals of this plan are to 
ensure that eligible military beneficiaries have access to stable, high-quality health care 
benefits and to improve the efficiency of the military health care system. To accomplish 
those goals, DoD proposes to establish a new approach to delivering and financing health 
care in the military on a regional level that will include both a system of capitated 
budgeting and a new triple option benefit package (CBO, April1994). 
a. Triple Option Benefit Structure 
The TRICARE program would offer eligible military beneficiaries three 
options for health benefits. One choice would be to enroll in TRICARE Prime, a plan 
modeled after private sector health maintenance organizations (HMOs), but with a point-
of-service (POS) option that would permit enrollees to retain the freedom to choose their 
own doctor. TRICARE Prime is available to all CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries. 
Active duty members are automatically enrolled and there are no annual fees for them 
and their families. Enrolled nonactive-duty members will pay an annual enrollment fee 
and reduced CHAMPUS cost shares and copayments (point-of-service charges). 
TRICARE Prime enrollees will also have access to a Primary Care Manager (PCM) who 
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is responsible for coordinating patient referrals for health care within the integrated 
civilian and military provider network (BUMED paper, 13 October 1995). 
A second choice would be to continue using the standard CHAMPUS 
benefit plan, called TRICARE Standard. Beneficiaries are not required to enroll and 
have a greater choice in selecting their particular provider. In doing do, beneficiaries will 
also continue to have access to the MTFs on a space-available basis in order of their 
priority status. When care is not available at the MTFs, beneficiaries under TRICARE 
Standard will retain the freedom to choose their own doctors, but they will pay higher 
out-of-pocket costs than under TRICARE Prime. This option also requires payment of 
annual deductibles and more costly copayments (BUMED paper, 13 October 1995, p. 
16). 
A third choice for those using TRICARE Standard would be to participate 
in TRICARE Extra, a preferred provider option (PPO), on a case by case basis. 
TRICARE Extra requires no enrollment and offers the following features: 
• Lower costs (five percent lower cost share after deductible is met with lower 
negotiated network provider rates). 
• Less paperwork (no claim forms to file). 
• Choice (beneficiaries choose from a network of providers). 
• No balance billing (if using network providers) (BUMED paper, 13 October 
1995, p. 16). 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarize the TRICARE enrollment options and 
cost shares for active-duty family members, retirees and their family members. As 
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mentioned earlier, there are no enrollment fees for active-duty family members. 
Currently, a single retiree pays for an enrollment fees of$230 and $460 for a family. The 
average active duty family is expected to save an average of $200 per year under 
TRICARE Prime compared to TRICARE Standard. Despite the fees, the average retiree 
family is expected to save $160 a year under TRICARE Prime compared to TRICARE 
Standard. 
TRICARE Enrollment Options and Cost Shares 
for Active-duty Family Members 
TRICARE TRICARE TRICARE 
Prime Prime Extra 
(E-1 thru E-4) (E-5 and above) 
Annual $0 $0 $ 150 individual 
Deductible $300 family 
Civilian $6 $ 12 15 percent of 
Outpatient Visit negotiated fee 
Civilian $ 11 per day $ 11 per day Greater of$ 25 or 
Inpatient Care ($ 25 minimum) $ 9.70 per day 










25 or$ 9.70 
per day 
4source: Foundation Health Services, Inc., TRICARE 
Program Features and Benefits Handbook, 1996, pp. 10-12. 
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TRICARE Enrollment Options and Cost Shares 
for Retirees, Survivors and Their Family Members 
TRICARE TRICARE TRICARE 
Prime Extra Standard 
Annual $230 per person None None 
Enrollment Fee $460 Family 
Annual None $ 150 per person $ 150 per person 
Deductible $ 3 00 per family $ 3 00 per family 
Civilian $ 12 copayment 20 percent of 25 percent of 
Outpatient Visit contracted fee CHAMP US 
allowable 
Civilian $ 11 per day Lesser of$ 250 Lesser of$ 3 23 per 
Inpatient Care ($ 25 minimum) per day or day or 
25 percent cost- 25 percent cost-
share of total share of total 
contracted rate billed charges 
Table 3.2. TRICARE Option Costs5 
4. Lead Agents 
In 1993, DoD established twelve health service regions across the country. 
Within each region, DoD has appointed a military medical "Lead Agent" (the 
commanding officer of a major military medical center in the region) with responsibility 
for coordinating the health delivery systems of each of the military services, as well as 
CHAMPUS (BUMED Paper, 13 October 1995, p. 21). 
Specifically, each Lead Agent will be responsible for developing a Regional 
Health Services (RHS) plan in conjunction with the hospital commanders of the military 
5source: Foundation Health Services, Inc., TRICARE 
Program Features and Benefits Handbook, 1996, pp. 10-12. 
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medical facilities within the region. Each plan is expected to outline how the region 
intends to meet the goals of managed care, and in particular, its plans for both setting up 
a civilian provider network and adopting utilization management (CBO, April1994). 
MTFs within each region retain their parent Service's chain-of-command. 
Consequently, each Service will retain their authority to make decisions regarding direct 
care (MTF) operating funds, facility maintenance, and personnel actions. Therefore, the 
Lead Agent does not control the funds that flow from the Services to their respective 
facilities within the region or the CHAMPUS funds, which are controlled by DoD and the 
contractor. Lead Agents are, in effect, coordinators who attempt to ensure that MTFs in 
their region seek the most economical and efficient care possible. 
Since the Lead Agent does not necessarily have the same Service affiliation as the 
MTFs in the region, the specific responsibilities of the Lead Agents can vary among 
regions. Clearly, the success of the TRICARE program will be ultimately dependent on 
the Services' willingness and ability to work together cooperatively to ensure the efficient 
and effective execution of the regional health plan. 
Table 3.3 presents information on the twelve lead regions, including the 
designated Lead Agent for each region, the states included in the region, the estimated 
number ofbeneficiaries, and the number of military medical centers and hospitals located 
within each region. 
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Hospitals 
States in Beneficiary and 
Region Lead Agent Region Population Medical 
Centers 
1 National Capital CT, DE, D.C., 1,093,918 12 
(Bethesda, Walter :ME, MD, MA, 
Reed, Malcolm NH, NJ, NY, 
Gmw Medical PA, RI, VT, & 
Centers) Northern VA 
2 Portsmouth Naval NC, and 872,011 8 
Hospital Southern VA 
3 Eisenhower Army GA, SC, and 1,063,770 12 
Medical Center parts ofFL 
4 Keesler Air Force AL, TN, parts 595,024 10 
Medical Center ofFL, and LA 
5 Wright-Patterson IL, IN, KY, 653,328 5 
Air Force Medical MI, OH, WV, 
Center and WI 
6 Wilford Hall AR, OK, parts 949,778 14 
Air Force Medical ofLAand TX 
Center 
7 W.Beaumont AZ, NV, NM, 323,058 8 
Army Medical and parts of 
Center TX 
8 Ft. Carson Army CO, IA, KS, 732,821 13 
Medical Center MN,MO,MT, 
NE, ND, SD, 
UT, WY, and 
part ofiD 




States in Beneficiary and 
Region Lead Agent Region Population Medical 
Centers 
10 David Grant Air NorthemCA 328,590 5 
Force Medical 
Center 
11 Madigan Army OR, WA, and 350,439 4 
Medical Center parts ofiD 
12 Tripier Army m 151,750 1 
Medical Center 
Table 3.3. TRICARE Regional Breakdown6 (Continued) 
5. Managed Care Support (MCS) Contracts 
In addition to providing new options for health care and a new regional structure, 
TRICARE expands upon the DoD's experience in using contracted providers in 
demonstration programs to the entire MHSS. This program currently consists of a series 
of seven managed care support contracts that supplement the capabilities of regional 
military health care delivery networks within the Health Service region. These contracts 
are procured centrally by the Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS). 
The contracts are bid on a competitive basis, and are considered fixed-price, at-
risk contracts. Only the administrative portion of the contract has a fixed price; however, 
the health care price is subject to adjustments based on the basis of risk-sharing 
provisions in which the contractor and the government share losses or gains beyond 
6Source: GAO, Report to Congressional Requestors, 
Defense Health Care, "Issues and Challenges Confronting 
Military Medicine," 12 March 1995. 
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certain level. Price adjustments can be based on factors such as inflation, beneficiary 
population change, and MTF workload shifts. The risk-sharing and bid price adjustment 
features are intended to protect both the contractor and the government from large risks 
associated with these complex contracts (Boyer and Sobel, 1996, p. 786). 
The contracts, in general, are for a 5-year period (1 year plus 4 year option years), 
and DoD estimates that they will have a combined value of about $17 billion. In some 
cases, a single contract will be awarded for multiple regions (i.e., single contracts will be 
awarded for Regions 2 and 5, Regions 3 and 4, Regions 7 and 8, and Regions 9, 10 and 
12) (Lamar, 1994, p. 11). All contracts are expected to be awarded by 1997. 
(Scaramozzino, personal communication, October 1996) 
Specifically, the contractors will develop networks of civilian providers around 
the MTFs, locate providers for beneficiaries, perform utilization management functions, 
process claims, provide beneficiary support functions, and provide administrative support 
to the Lead Agent, MTF commanders and staff (Scaramozzino, personal communication, 
July 1996). 
The role of the Lead Agent in these MCS contracts is to provide input to the 
contract proposal and include any region-specific requirements. The Lead Agent is also 
responsible for ensuring the smooth integration of the civilian provider networks with the 
MTFs (Lamar, 1994, p. 11). 
6. Specialized Treatment Services (STS) 
CHAMPUS beneficiaries in need of certain highly specialized high-cost medical 
care will be referred to a designated national or regional military or civilian treatment 
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facility-- a Specialized Treatment Services (STS) facility. The specific types of care to 
be covered and the sites at which specialized care must be obtained will be announced by 
Health Affairs. A medical facility may be designated as an STS based on its record of 
readiness, access, quality, and cost. Lead Agents may designate regional STS facilities 
as a component of their regional health plans. An MTF commander can withhold a non-
availability statement (NAS) based on the availability of care designated at STS sites 
(Lamar, 1994, p. 12). 
B. PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION OF MILITARY HEALTH CARE 
Beneficiaries and providers in the direct care sector of the military health care 
system face few incentives to economize. This is mostly due to two factors: (1) a benefit 
structure with low cost-sharing requirements that encourages excessive use by patients; 
and (2) a lack of constraints on providers to curb the delivery of unnecessary and 
inappropriate health care. These problems are compounded by the interplay between the 
services' wartime and peacetime missions. 
1. The Department of the Navy's Medical Mission 
The Navy Medical Department provides a comprehensive health care benefits 
package to its nearly 2. 6 million beneficiaries, including active duty sailors and marines, 
their families, survivors, retirees and all their families. This entitlement has grown over 
the years from the initial requirement of providing health care to assure a healthy fighting 
force to that of providing a comprehensive health benefit as part of an overall employee 
compensation package. This package is essential to attracting and maintaining necessary 
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people to meet the Department of the Navy's (DON's) all-volunteer force and its mission 
requirements (Lanier, 1993, p. 121) . 
The Navy Medical Department, just like the other Services' medical departments, 
must be prepared to operate and support the warfighting forces in every comer of the 
world. It meets this mandate through forward deployed medical forces placed on board 
combat ships and hospital ships, fleet hospitals, in overseas (OCONUS) MTFs, at dental 
treatment facilities (DTFs), and with the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). In the continental 
United States (CONUS), through a direct care system ofMTFs, the Navy Medical 
Department provides training and support for forward deployed medical units, additional 
primary care services, secondary, and tertiary levels of care to active duty DON, and 
other uniformed service members. The CONUS MTFs also provide a rotation base for 
relief from operational assignments and duty OCONUS. 
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics involved in meeting Navy medicine's dual 
health care mission: the readiness requirement and the benefit of employment 
requirement. This thesis will briefly describe the military's peacetime health benefit 
mission and the related problems associated with it. 
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Navy Medicine's Dual Mission 
·The Health Care Continuum 
Readiness Mission ~ 
Forward Deployed 










2. The Problem of High Use 
Compared with other health care plans, the military health care benefit, in 
general, is extremely generous. Care in the MTFs is virtually free to eligible 
beneficiaries. These beneficiaries face no deductible and almost no copayments for 
outpatient care and prescription drugs. Even for inpatient care, some beneficiaries pay 
only nominal fees, while others pay nothing. In addition, eligible military beneficiaries 
are not subject to any premium and depending on TRICARE option, some have no 
requirement to enroll in a military health care plan, but instead are free to receive all, 
some or none of their care from the military health care system. The generosity of the 
benefit structure may help to explain why, compared with the U.S. population at large, 
military beneficiaries under the age of 65 make heavy use of health care. 
a. Outpatient Care 
Active duty family members make heavy use of outpatient services. 
While the average rate of outpatient visits in the civilian population is about five a year, 
active duty dependents average seven outpatient visits a year - - a difference of 40 
percent. Such high per capita use is one cause for the tremendous outpatient workloads 
in MTFs, making it difficult for beneficiaries to obtain care in a timely manner. The 
typical non-active duty patient waits about 10 days to get an appointment with a military 
physician, which is twice as long as the wait reported for nonactive outpatients in civilian 
facilities. In a sense, then, high per capita use feeds dissatisfaction among beneficiaries 
(CBO, April1994). 
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b. Inpatient Care 
Active duty family members also make extensive use of inpatient services. 
For every thousand dependents living inside a military catchment area, DoD pays for 676 
hospital days a year. By comparison, hospital day rates for the general population 
younger than 65 years of age was 530 per thousand-- a difference of about 22 percent. 
The probable reason for extensive military use is a high rate of admission, as opposed to 
greater than average lengths of stays in military hospitals (CBO, April1994). 
Another reason for high use of inpatient services in the MTFs suggests a 
variation in practice patterns of physicians in different regions or catchment areas. This 
variation in practice patterns of physicians can significantly influence utilization 
management in patient care (Scaramozzino, personal communication, October 1996). 
After catchment area populations are adjusted for age and sex disparities, 25 percent of 
the catchment areas had more than 247 hospital admissions per thousand active duty 
dependents (the 75th percentile among the 129 catchment areas analyzed), and 25 per 
cent had 187 or fewer admissions per thousand (the 25th percentile). The median 
catchment area had 219 admissions, with the range extending from 81 admissions to 
more than 385 admissions per thousand dependents (CBO, April1994). The differences 
among catchment areas are not discussed in this thesis. 
Historically, the capacity of military hospitals and clinics (MTFs) has 
fallen short of requirements for both missions. However, the resulting estimates in the 
congressionally directed "Section 733 Study" indicate that the MTFs' capacity is now 
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well above the projected wartime requirements, in contrast to the situation that existed 
during the Cold War (OPA&E, April1994). 
The peacetime portion of the "733 Study" examined the economics of 
sizing the military medical establishment and determined if care in MTFs is more cost-
effective than care received under CHAMPUS. The results of the study concluded that, 
for individual episodes of treatment, it costs less to provide care in the MTFs than 
through CHAMPUS and that recapturing CHAMPUS' workloads on a one-for-one basis 
would lower DoD's costs (OP A&E, April1994). 
However, the same report found that improving access to care at the MTFs 
would increase total medical costs, because savings from recapturing individual cases 
would be offset by increases in the volume of care provided at the MTFs. The principal 
reason for this finding is that improved access would encourage some beneficiaries to 
reenter the military health care system and forgo receiving care from other non-DoD 
sources. A secondary reason is that the rates of health care use among beneficiaries are 
higher when they receive care at the MTFs, because it is virtually free to beneficiaries 
and military providers tend to deliver more care than civilian health care providers 
(OPA&E, April1994). 
C. CAPITATION-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE MILITARY 
HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM (MHSS) 
The MHSS has traditionally programmed for health programs on the basis of 
historical resource consumption and workload trends. A limitation to this approach is a 
built-in incentive to produce more output, or more services, than may be medically 
necessary. For example, hospital commanders were rewarded with larger or sustained 
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budgets for generating more workload without always being held accountable for the 
necessity of the workload generated. 
Driven by the momentum of national health care reform and the continued 
projections of funding constraints in the future, DoD is attempting to implement several 
policies to control costs of providing health care services to its beneficiaries. One 
alternative measure that the DoD instituted to contain health care costs is the system-
wide adoption ofTRICARE Program to the entire MHSS and a capitated-based resource 
allocation model. 
As mentioned earlier, these real and projected changes within the DoD have 
created a need to transition from a disease-based workload measure to a capitation-based 
resource allocation methodology. The particular methodology that the MHSS follows is 
a population driven capitated model. 
1. Capitated Budgeting 
To give hospital commanders a fiscal incentive to control costs, DoD introduced a 
system of capitated budgeting in 1994. Under this system, each of the military 
departments, and in tum each commander, receives a fixed amount per beneficiary for 
providing all health care to the population within the hospital's defined service area. 
By limiting future budgets to a fixed amount per person, DoD hopes to revise the 
set of economic incentives facing MTF commanders and encourage military providers to 
deliver only care that is both necessary and appropriate. This approach, if carried out 
effectively, would reverse a system of budgeting on the basis of historical patterns by 
MTFs in providing care and using resources. DoD's approach to capitation eliminates 
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most of the incentives that reward hospital commanders with larger budgets if they 
provide more health care. 
2. Transition of Capitation Budgeting in the MHSS 
DoD's adoption of capitation-based resource allocation in 1994 was not the first 
foray of the military departments into capitation budgeting. The first trial project of the 
three Services into capitation budgeting was conducted in the late 1970's. 
In the early 1970's, rising military health care costs led to congressional interest in 
alternative health care delivery systems in which efficiency and cost containment had 
been successfully demonstrated in the private sector. As a result of increased 
Administration and congressional interest in military health care costs, among other 
concerns, the Military Health Care Study was commissioned in 1973 ( CBO Report, 
January 1988). 
In August 1973, DoD, in coordination with the Department ofHealth, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) and the Office ofManagement and Budget, launched a 
comprehensive study on military health care. The "Military Health Care Study" was a 
major three-year review designed to examine the HMO experience and determine if a 
capitation budgeting approach similar to those employed by HMOs could be achieved in 
the MHSS (CBO Report, January 1988). 
One of the report's recommendations ("Recommendation No.5") was that 
resource programming and budgeting for the MHSS in CONUS should be done on a 
capitation basis (OASD(HA)'s Working Group on "733 Study" Update, Appendix G, 
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16 May 1996). In addition, this comprehensive study of the military health care system 
made the following recommendations: 
• Planning for health care delivery should be based primarily on the size and 
demographic characteristics of the population to be served; 
• Funds for the direct care system and for CHAMPUS should be integrated; and 
• Costs per beneficiary should be developed and used as a measure of efficiency 
and performance. (CBO Report, January 1988) 
These recommendations formed the basis and purpose of the Capitation 
Budgeting Demonstration (Pilot) Project from 1978 to 1981. However, during the 
subsequent evaluation, a government contractor determined that the tested methodology 
did not result in significant improvements over the traditional budgeting system. 
Consequently, the demonstration or first capitation-budgeting pilot project was 
terminated (CBO, January 1988). 
Then, within the past decade, both domestic and global events, such as the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the uncertain domestic economy, the breakup of the former Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the downsizing of the U.S. military forces, brought 
significant challenges to DoD. With increasingly tight constraints on resources, and 
public clamor to reap a peace dividend, DoD has sought to maintain its vital mission of 
military preparedness as well as to execute its medical mission more effectively. 
More recently, the role of the MHSS in the restructuring of the nation's health 
care delivery system, driven by the momentum of national health care reform, has been 
addressed by both the Administration and Congress. The national debate centers around 
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how best to improve access to quality care and achieve economies without reducing the 
health care benefits ofbeneficiaries. 
The focal point of capitation-based budgeting in conjunction with the TRICARE 
program is to control health care costs and optimize the use of all MHSS resources. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, capitation budgeting is a recognized strategy for health 
care cost containment in the private sector. 
a. Chronology of Events 
The following studies, reports and reviews undoubtedly played an 
important role in the implementation of a capitated budgeting in the MHSS. These 
events over the past three years have helped shape the use of capitation financing in the 
Department of Defense's Medical Program: 
• July 1993 --A policy memorandum from the OASD(HA) entitled "Preparing 
the Military Health Services System (MHSS) for Capitation-based Resource 
Allocation" dated July 23, 1993 directed the implementation of the FY94 
capitation methodology for the Military Departments to be used in allocating 
FY94 Defense Health Program (DHP) funds. 
• April 1994 -- "The Economics of Sizing the Military Medical Establishment --
Executive Report of the Comprehensive Study of the Military Medical Care 
System" directed by Section 733 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, and further modified by Section 723 of the 
Fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, and conducted by the 
Department of Defense, Office ofProgram Analysis and Evaluation, concluded 
that "DoD can cost-effectively size to peacetime requirements only if it 
manages the demand effect through a combination of ... managed care and 
capitation budgeting, possibly including copayments and deductibles for care 
received in MTFs." 
• May 1994 --"Defense Planning Guidance FY1996- 2001," dated May 23, 
1994 suggested actions regarding the medical infrastructure: "Peacetime 
medical expenses should continue to undergo aggressive review. The 
Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Health Affairs) will continue to implement 
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plans to control medical costs, including the use of capitation financing 
methodology to support medical facility budgets, and devise methods for 
directing patients to most appropriate sources of treatment, such as 
gatekeeping and utilization management." 
• March 1995 --"Representatives from the Offices of the Director, Program 
Analysis and Evaluation and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health 
Affairs) co-chaired a working group to study the structure of medical 
programming in the DoD and to refine the current capitation model for 
analyzing Defense Health Program (DHP) resource requirements. This effort 
was intended to form the basis for work by a Program Review Issue Team for 
the FY97-01 Program Review." 
• May 1995 --The "Defense Planning Guidance FY1997-2001," dated May 9, 
1995 suggested the following actions: " ... The Assistant Secretary ofDefense 
(Health Affairs) will control medical costs by using the capitation financing 
methodology to support medical facility program development, budget 
formulation and execution, and to devise methods for directing patients to the 
most appropriate sources of treatment, such as gate-keeping and utilization 
management." (Draft 733 Update Report, Appendix G, 16 May 1996) 
But even before the full effect of the events described above has been 
assessed, the call has come from Health Affairs to revisit the capitation budgeting 
standards designed to allocate DHP resources. In August 1996, Health Affairs asked the 
military medical departments to identify representatives to participate in a TRI-SERVICE 
Capitation working group. The objective of this working group is to review the DHP 
Hospital-level Capitation Model and to make recommendations to improve the model (P. 
Keams, personal communication, August 1996). 
3. Basic Resource Allocation Plan 
The Health Affairs' resource allocation plan is based upon a two-step process that 
reflects each Service's individual requirements, yet is consistent with the overall Defense 
Health Program resource allocation framework. Health Affairs allocates CHAMPUS, 
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direct care operations and maintenance (O&M), and military personnel resources to the 
three Services, using a modified capitation methodology. 
Then the Military Departments allocate resources to each of their MTFs based on 
a modified capitation methodology, which is designed by the Services to meet their 
unique requirements as approved by Health Affairs. Also, the Military Departments will 
identify all CHAMP US resources for each of the twelve regions. The method for further 
allocating the CHAMPUS resources will be dependent on the historical CHAMPUS costs 
for each of the catchment areas and the existence of a fixed price, "at-risk" TRICARE 
Support contract. Calculation of the allocation ofCHAMPUS resources to MTFs in 
regions with such contracts will be done by Health Affairs and provided to the Military 
Departments (Frederick, personal communication, August 1996). 
a. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel 
(MILPERS) Resources 
Under the regionalization concept, the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
direct care and military personnel (MILPERS) resources will continue to flow from 
Health Affairs through the Military Departments to the MTFs without change. The MTF 
commander will continue to have control over the allocated O&M direct care and 
military personnel resources. 
In order to minimize potential problems, Health Affairs did not change the 
authority and responsibility of the MTF commanders to make manpower decisions 
regarding military assignments and balance in their overall staffing levels. In a sense, 
MTF commander were allowed to direct military personnel resources, on a temporary 
basis, to provide needed health care services in lieu of contracts or CHAMPUS at other 
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MTFs. Service-specific command and control of the MTFs and legal liability for over-
obligation of O&M direct care resources did not change (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 
February 1994). 
b. CHAMPUS Resources 
All CHAMPUS resources are allocated by Health Affairs to the Military 
Departments based on the capitation methodology. Until TRICARE Support contracts 
are established for all regions, the Military Departments will continually calculate 
catchment area and non-catchment area CHAMPUS costs for their beneficiaries in each 
of the regions. 
In regions that do not have a TRICARE Support contract in place, the 
operations and maintenance (O&M) CHAMPUS funds were included in the budget 
allocation of the Military Departments. The Military Departments hold their Service's 
share of the CHAMPUS budget at the Service headquarters level. Since Lead Agents 
have administrative responsibility for coordinating the management of the CHAMP US 
program, Military Medical Departments are required to identify the beneficiaries' share of 
the CHAMPUS requirement for each region, and report the amount held for each region 
to the Lead Agent's parent service. Each of the Lead Agents receives information and 
fiscal guidance through their parent Service's chain-of-command that identifies their total 
CHAMPUS budget with Service-specific and catchment area-specific subtotals. 
For example, the Navy has Lead Agent responsibility for Southern 
California, Region 9. At the Surgeon General's level, the Air Force and Army will notify 
the Navy of the total funds they are holding for their Services' beneficiaries in the 
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Southern California region. The Navy Medical Department (Bureau ofMedicine and 
Surgery) will then be responsible for providing the necessary financial information and 
fiscal guidance to the Lead Agent, who is the Commanding Officer of the Naval 
Hospital, San Diego, California. 
One of the responsibilities of the Lead Agent is to develop and coordinate 
a Regional Health Services (RHS) plan. Based on the RHS plan, the Lead Agent 
provides recommendations to the Services that CHAMPUS resources be released to the 
appropriate MTF for direct care projects designed to reduce overall costs. 
Both OCHAMPUS and Health Affairs monitor the expenditure of 
CHAMPUS resources by the Military Departments. One reporting system that both 
OCHAMPUS and Health Affairs use to monitor CHAMPUS expenses within a 
catchment area or region is the Regional Paid Data Management Report (RPDMR). 
Another system that is useful to the MTF Commander in monitoring CHAMPUS 
spending is called the Catchment Area Billing Report (CABR). 
In regions with TRICARE Support contracts, the MTFs' CHAMPUS 
allocations are retained by the parent Services and pooled among the Services to fund the 
Lead Agent's execution of the support contract. Health Affairs calculates both catchment 
area and out-of-catchment area CHAMPUS allocations and provides them to the Military 
Departments. Under this methodology, each Service remains jointly accountable for the 
TRICARE Support contract (OASD(HA) Memorandum, April1994). 
In managing CHAMPUS funds, the MTF commander is in liaison with the 
Lead Agent, the specific Service, and even OCHAMPUS. The Regional Lead Agent 
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helps coordinate medical care between different Services' MTFs. For those services not 
offered at an MTF, the Commander can seek assistance from the Lead Agent. If there is 
an MTF in the region to which a patient can be referred, it can be a cost saving 
alternative. It may be that a service unavailable at one MTF in a region is available at 
another and that referral opportunities can be created which will obviate the need for 
developing or enhancing the needed service at the first MTF. The referring MTF may 
pay the marginal cost of treating that patient if the receiving MTF cannot absorb the 
referral in their funding base. This concept is known within the MHSS as "transfer 
payments." 
4. Transfer Payments 
Transfer payments are unique to the military and not a factor in the private sector 
capitated model. This thesis will not show the algorithms used to determine transfer 
payments. Instead, the conceptual framework employed by Health Affairs will be 
discussed. 
Transfer payments are handled at the headquarters level of the three military 
health services. This avoids having local MTFs reimburse other MTFs for providing care 
to beneficiaries outside their 40-mile catchment area, referred to as "cross- over 
population." Usually, MTFs have funds in their base to treat a majority of these patients 
based on their history of referrals from outside their catchment area. However, if a non-
catchment area beneficiary receives care from an MTF that is not included in their base, 
then a transfer payment will be made. The time interval at which these payment will be 
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made has yet to be determined (i.e., quarterly or annually) (Leibold, personal 
communication, 18 September 1996). 
5. Shared Resource Management 
Lead Agents are responsible for and have the auihority to oversee CHAMPUS 
dollars for their regions following the award of the TRICARE Support Contract. Each of 
the hospitals within the regions will be funded directly for direct care and military 
personnel dollars. However, CHAMPUS funds will be managed on a regional basis. 
Although the capitated budget of the MTF includes its CHAMPUS target, these targets 
are rolled up to the regional level for Lead Agent oversight. Thus, a balance will have to 
be achieved between direct care and CHAMPUS operations. The effective management 
of referrals between direct care and CHAMPUS providers, coupled with strong 
utilization management efforts within both systems, will be essential to the financial 
success and optimal use of regional health care resources. 
This optimization of regional health care resources implies making the best use of 
available resources to achieve the objectives of a system, subject to the constraints under 
which the system operates. In the context of resource sharing, this translates into 
determining the types and amounts of resources which should be shared between an MTF 
and a TRICARE Support contractor in order to ensure the lowest overall health care costs 
for the government, subject to the constraints of the contract and the MHSS in which it 
operates. 
From the MTF perspective, resource sharing presents an opportunity to enhance 
its in-house capability to provide a greater proportion of the care needed by the 
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beneficiaries it serves and to do so under conditions which enhance the working 
environment within the MTF. Due in part to the inflexibility of the resource allocation 
system under which MTFs operate, there are often circumstances in which an MTF does 
not have the right mix of resources to provide a particular service in an efficient manner. 
Resource sharing may provide a method of fixing this imbalance with only minimal 
marginal cost increases to the MTF, by allowing the contractor to provide needed 
services or support personnel in exchange for the MTFs providing more visits for 
CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries. 
Resource sharing is one feature ofTRICARE Support Contracts which allows the 
contractor, through agreements with MTF commanders, to provide personnel, equipment, 
supplies, and in other versions of the contracts, cash payments to an MTF for purposes of 
enhancing the capability of the facility to provide care to CHAMPUS-eligible 
beneficiaries (OCHAMPUS Memorandum, December 1994). It is based on an 
assumption that costs associated with the provision of these resources will be more than 
offset by decreased CHAMPUS costs and will result in savings to both the contractor and 
the government. 
However, one of the pitfalls of resource sharing with TRICARE Support 
contractors is an implied contractual obligation on the part of the government to 
cooperate with the contractor in implementing an effective resource sharing program, so 
that the cost avoidance goals of the contract can be met. In essence, resource sharing 
opportunities must be carefully analyzed prior to entering into agreements and closely 
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monitored during operations to ensure that the CHAMPUS cost avoidance goals of the 
contract are achieved or exceeded in such a way that: 
1) The MTF's budget is not jeopardized because of the level of its own resources 
required to support the project; and 
2) Overall savings for the MHSS are achieved (OCHAMPUS Memorandum, 
December 1994). 
An example is a resource sharing agreement in which a cardiology service is 
provided by the contractor for CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries within the MTF. This 
new service would allow recapture of CHAMPUS costs and better utilization of existing 
facilities. However, it may result in increased costs for in-house ancillary services. 
There is also a strong likelihood that this new service would result in an increased 
pharmacy costs due to additional prescriptions being filled for expensive heart 
medications. Therefore, MTF commanders and staffs must be aware of the costs they 
incur in conjunction with the resource sharing program. Also, health care administrators 
need to evaluate how their investments in resource sharing programs will impact their 
individual operating budgets as well as contract costs. 
Another feature of the TRICARE Support Contract that may result in additional 
government costs for the resource sharing program is the Bid Price Adjustment, a 
mechanism for determining payment for health care contracts. 
6. The Bid Price Adjustment (BPA) Formula 
Bid Price Adjustment is a formula which calculates the ultimate amount of funds 
a contractee will receive for accepting a managed care support contract. There are many 
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different scenarios which can be played out using BP As. The main point is that 
payments to the MTF and MCS contractee are adjusted for changes in the total workload. 
The contractor is responsible for at least a minimum fee to the contractee. Because the 
contractee gears up resources to accommodate the potential influx of patients, the 
contractor is responsible for a portion ofthese fixed costs. However, the BPA contract is 
not a fixed fee contract. The government is not obligated or committed to the entire 
agreed dollar contract amount. 
For example, suppose an MTF has an estimated 3,000 orthopaedic cases in its 
catchment area for the year, but has a limited number of military providers (i.e., 
Orthopaedists) and can only accommodate 1,500 cases. A managed care contract will be 
established for those remaining 1,500 cases that the MTF cannot accommodate. The 
contractee who accepts the contract is paid based on the amount of work it performs. 
Thus, if the MTF recaptures a portion of the contractee's 1,500 cases, contract payment is 
adjusted. The opposite also holds true. If for some reason the MTF closed their 
Orthopaedic service and the contractee had to absorb the increased patient load, they 
would also receive an adjustment utilizing the BP A formula. 
Captain Montgomery, in his paper entitled "Optimizing Resource Sharing 
Opportunities Under Managed Care Contracts," presented this "simplified" BPA 
formula: 
PC = 0 X R X E X K 
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where: 
PC =the projected cost for the cost category, 
0 = the MTF utilization index, 
R = the resource sharing trend factor for the cost category, 
E =the projected number of eligibles in the option period; and 
K = the projected weighted cost per eligible for the option period, 
with no changes in MTF utilization or resource sharing taken 
into account (Montgomery, 1994, pp. A2-3). 
One of the ways in which the above formula is oversimplified is that the resource 
sharing trend factor (represented above by "R") is actually one of the many factors that 
go into making up the projected average weighted cost per eligible (represented above by 
"K"). That is, the "K" term actually does take resource sharing into account. The other 
factors that go into computing the projected average weighted cost per eligible are: 
• The base-period cost per eligible for TRICARE Prime, Extra, and Standard; 
• The projected proportion of eligibles who use TRICARE Prime, Extra, and 
Standard; and 
• The total trend index for TRICARE Prime, Extra, and Standard for the option 
period. (Montgomery, 1994, pp. A2-4) 
This trending of weighted costs occurs for all other cost categories and for each 
patient type for each option period. Thus, each resource sharing trend factor exerts its 
own impact on the particular cost category to which it applies and removes the 
contractor's projected savings due to resource sharing investments :from the health care 
cost build up, on which the bid price is based. 
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D. HEALTH AFFAIRS MODIFIED CAPITATION MODEL 
As mentioned in the previous section, as part of the transition to TRICARE, the 
DoD adopted a modified capitation approach in which the OASD(HA) allocates some 
resources to the services' medical departments on a per capita basis. This model is a 
population driven system which is based on users instead of eligible beneficiaries. The 
model was designed to ensure that the military unique functions of the MHSS, those 
dealing with medical readiness, have all the required funding needed to support its 
operations. 
Health Affairs, in agreement with the Services' representatives, established major 
components to determine a Service's share ofDHP resources and for setting the capitated 
rate. The major components of this modified capitation model are: Total Resources 
(Operations and Maintenance (O&M)); CHAMPUS; Military Personnel (MILPERS); and 
Cost Drivers (User Beneficiary Population). 
The DHP capitation model is comprised of three separate resource categories: 
Category I (Overseas and Military Unique Non-Capitated); Category ll (Military Unique 
Capitated Rate and Education and Training); and Category lli (Capitated Medical Care). 
Each category is further divided into subcategories. Segregating resources into 
categories and subcategories identifies and protects the medical readiness mission, allows 
for the application of the appropriate population based cost drivers, and provides a means 
of assessing the cost effectiveness of DoD health care with civilian resources 
(OASD(HA) Policy Paper, July 1993). Figure 4 presents the percentage ofDefense 
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Health Program resources by category for FY97. A more detailed description of 
each category is presented below. 
DHP RESOURCES BY CATEGORY 
FISCAL YEAR 1997 
m CATI 
• CAT liB 
• CAT IIA 
• CAT Ill 
Figure 4: DHP Resources Category - FY977 
1. Capitation Category I- Overseas and Military Unique Non-Capitated 
The Overseas Activities subcategory includes all resources necessary to support 
the DHP's overseas medical presence. Resources for overseas activities are estimated on 
a capitation basis using active duty members and family members of active duty 
population stationed overseas as a cost driver. 
The Other Military Unique Non-Capitated Functions subcategory includes all 
resources for Aeromedical Evacuation, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), 
7source: Colonel Frederick (OASD(HA)), Briefing Paper: 
"Health Affairs' Capitation Methodology," 1996. 
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Environmental Restoration/Compliance, Capital Expense Initial Outfitting, and the 
Military Entrance and Processing Command (MEPCM). This subcategory is 
programmed on a non-capitated, level-of-effort basis. 
2. Capitation Category IT - Military Unique Capitated Functions and 
Education and Training 
Category II reflects those costs associated with mission requirements which are 
unique to each of the Military Medical Departments. Activities which support a large 
number of active duty military receive an additive value to the capitated rate since this 
category is actually based on the size of the Services' military force structure. 
Category II is composed of two subcategories: Category IIA (Military Unique 
Capitated Functions) and Category liB (Education and Training). Category IIA includes 
Public and Occupational Health, Blood, Dental, Veterinary Medicine, Optical, and 
Readiness Exercises. Resources are estimated using the U.S. active duty military 
population as a cost driver. Category liB includes the medical technical schools operated 
by the three Military Departments, the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP), 
and Graduate Medical Education (GME) programs. 
3. Capitation Category m -Capitated Medical Care 
Category III contains approximately seventy five percent ofDHP resources and is 
divided into thfee subcategories: In-house Direct Care, CHAMPUS, and Other Business 
Operating Support (OBOS). This category is the bulk of the Services' medical capitated 
cost, which is similar to the rate seen in HMOs and managed care plans in the private 
sector. The aggregate of these three components makes up the Health Affairs capitated 
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budget. Appendix B provides steps in determining the Health Affairs capitation 
requirement. 
In-house Direct Care, CHAMPUS, and Other Support subcategories are further 
divided by beneficiary category: US active duty military members, US CHAN.IPUS 
users, and US Medicare eligible users. Figure 5 below shows the relationships of 
capitation Category III and its funding subcategories and their respective drivers. 
Figure 5: Capitation Category ill Funding: Relationships of the Funding 
Subcategories and Their Respective Drivers8 • 
8Source: OASD (HA), Report of the "733 Study" Update 
Working Group, Appendix G, 16 May 1996. 
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4. Defined Beneficiary Population 
Not all MHSS eligible beneficiaries use the system (CBO, Aprill994, p. 6). For 
the purposes of computing capitation rates, Health Affairs used the number of estimated 
users of the system, based on full-time equivalents, rather than the number of eligibles. 
Health Affairs acknowledges that it does not know the number of actual users because it 
does not require beneficiaries to select and enroll in a single health care plan. Until an 
enrollment system is in place, the number of users will be measured by means of a 
survey. Health Affairs, through a health services research unit (located at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California), conducts a questionnaire survey ofMHSS 
beneficiaries semi-annually to gather various statistics on MHSS utilization. From this 
survey, Health Affairs can determine the estimated number of users by Service, region 
andMTF. 
Thus, for computing the capitated rate, Health Affairs used an estimate of the 
number of actual users, based on full-time equivalent (FTE) users of direct care and 
CHAMPUS. Appendix C describes the methodology that Health Affairs uses to calculate 
the user population. The three Services, however, in formulating their "Service specific" 
capitation methodology, used eligible benefiCiaries vice actual users to help their MTFs 
transition to a capitated financing system. The Military Departments use their Service-
specific methodology or methodologies to re-allocate DHP resources by capitation to the 
MTF or catchment area level (OASD(HA) Memorandum, July 1993). 
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5. Calculation of the FY94 Capitated Rate 
The OASD(HA), in coordination with the three Services, implemented the 
modified capitation methodology and used this model to allocate FY94 DHP funds 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, July 1993). Figure 6 presents a basic equation for 
determining the capitated rate per beneficiary. The three elements of the Category ill 
costs comprise the numerator for determining the Services' capitation rates. For Health 
Affairs, the number of estimated users is the basis for determining the denominator. 






Figure 6: Health Affairs' Modified Capitation For.mula 
The base year ofFY92 was used and adjusted to reflect existing funding 
anomalies, such as the Army's Base Operating Support (BOS) costs, items funded from 
other than Medical Force Program 8 sources, and others. The amounts expended in 
FY92 for Military Medical Support and Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate were 
subtracted from the total obligations to yield the Medical Capitated Cost amount. Then, 
this amount was divided by the Military Department estimated user beneficiary 
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population to yield a Military Department specific capitation rate. This rate was inflated 
and adjusted to FY94, with corrections based upon FY93 execution data. As the model 
evolves and more costs are identified under each specific Capitation Category, the need 
for adjustments will be eliminated. 
E. SUMMARY 
In sum, TRICARE represents a major reengineering of the way health care is 
managed in the MHS S. Significant components include a system of primary care 
managers and health care networks, comprehensive utilization management, a 
performance outcomes program, resource sharing incentives, and a modified capitation-
based resource allocation model. Lead Agents and MTF commanders will be aided by 
changes in how the delivery of care is organized and financed and by incentives that 
optimize MTF utilization. 
Along with providing quality care, containing cost, and improving patient access, 
integrating CHAMPUS and direct care systems has been the focal point of coordinating 
different types and levels of care in the MHSS. Because of the scope, magnitude and 
complexity of the MHSS and the extensive nature of its managed care elements, the 
capitation-based financing model will continue to be a major challenge as the DoD's 
TRICARE program is implemented nationwide. 
The next chapter will discuss the Department of the Navy's capitation-based 
resource allocation model. It will also address some of the issues and problems in 
implementing a capitation-based financing system within the Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery (BUMED). 
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IV. CAPITATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
The Navy Medical Department has traditionally programmed and budgeted for 
health care programs on the basis of historical workload. This approach is limited due to 
a built-in incentive to produce more output units to gain increased resources. In other 
words, the more work that is generated, the greater the amount of resources. In FY94, 
the Navy Medical Department introduced the use of a modified capitation-based resource 
allocation methodology under the direction of Health Affairs. The fundamental purpose 
for implementing this model is to create the proper incentives for the efficient use of 
scarce resources. 
This chapter will discuss the concept of a capitation-based resource allocation 
model in the Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery (BUMED), the major claimant for medical 
resources within the Department of the Navy (DoN). A subsequent section will describe 
the various information systems available to BUMED to support its capitation-based 
financing model. This chapter will also describe the "readiness-focused" capitation 
concept as proposed by the resource programmers at the Medical Finance Division of the 
Office ofthe Surgeon General (N-931), as an alternative approach to programming, 
planning and budgeting for BUMED's funding requirements. 
A. CAPITATIONINBUMED 
Capitation in BUMED is structured and approached differently than at Health 
Affairs. Specifically, the major difference is that BUMED uses "eligible beneficiaries" 
as the defined population, whereas Health Affairs bases its capitation process on "users." 
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The main reason for this departure from Health Affairs is to assist the MTFs in the 
transition to a capitation-based resource allocation system. As pointed out by Byrne, 
changing organizational culture and mind set from a fee-for-service, workload based 
system to a capitation-based model takes time (Byrne, 1995, p. 64). Figure 7 depicts the 
process BUMED follows to capitate the funds received from Health Affairs. 
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Figure 7: BUMED's Capitation Allocation Process9 
9Source: Martin, C. P., MED-01, Briefing Paper, 
"Program/Budget Realities and Change," Undated. 
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Health Affairs and BUMED use the same capitation categories. These categories 
include the OASD(HA)' s category breakouts of Military Medical Support (Category I), 
Military Medical-Unique Capitation (Categories TIA and TIB), and Medical Capitated 
Cost (Category Ill). However, in allocating direct care Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M), CHAMPUS, and military personnel (MILPERS) resources down to the MTFs 
level, BUMED blends historical experience with prospective per-capita calculations 
(BUMED Memorandum, 15 June 1994). Table 4.1 summarizes BUMED's capitation 
categories and the programs or functions that belong under each category. 
Capitation Category Programs/Functions Measures 
Category I OCONUS Medical Based on Inflation and 
(Military Medical Support) Operations, OCONUS Adjustment of 
Dental Operations Historical Bases 
CategoryTIA Readiness Functions, Based on Active Duty 
(Military Medical-Unique CONUS Dental Population Served 
Capitation) Operations, Optical, 
and Office of Medical & 
Dental Affairs (OM&DA) 
Category TIB Education and Based on the Total 
(Education and Training) Training Medical Department 
Officers and Enlisted 
on Staff 
Category Ill CONUS Medical Based on Total 
(Medical Capitated Cost) Operations, CHAMPUS Beneficiary Population 
Served 
Table 4.1: BUMED's Capitation Budgeting Categories10 
10Source: Zarkowsky 1 J. 1 MED-13 1 Briefing Paper 1 "How 
to Live Within a Capita ted Budget 1 " March 1995. 
85 
In general, BUMED begins its allocation process by reviewing the missions and 
functions of each command, such as a medical center, hospital, or "free standing" 
medical clinic. Next, based on historical expenditure review, BUMED compares the 
activity's base year (expense operating budget) and the activity's "end-of- the-year'' 
obligations. The activity's end of the year obligations are then adjusted for all one time 
"incremental" costs (BUMED Memorandum, 12 June 1994). 
For example: to detennine the FY-97 expense operating budget (EOB) for one of 
its activities, BUMED begins with the FY-96 funds allocation, subtracts FY-96 one-time 
costs, adds FY-97 new starts, then adjusts for programmatic changes, and finally, adds 
pay and inflation adjustments. The results of command reviews are consolidated by 
category to develop BUMED's overall Category I, Category ITA, Category liB, and 
Category III requirements. Table 4.2 provides a summary ofBUMED's FY96 funding 
base by each capitation category. 
$ (Thousands) O&M MILPERS TOTAL 
CATI $ 179,692 $ 193,600 $373,292 
CAT II 161,878 457,126 619,004 
CAT III 2,526,488 911,753 3,438,241 
TOTAL $2,868,058 $1,562,479 $4,430,537 
Table 4.2: BUMED's FY96 Funding Base11 
11Source: BUMED Paper, "First Quarter, FY96 Budget 
Execution Review," 22 February 1996. 
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As mentioned earlier, each fiscal year's control figure is calculated from the 
previous year's total patient care and non-patient care dollars. The activity's EOB 
consists of both patient and nonpatient care dollars, and serves as the control figure for 
each activity. (A detailed discussion on how BUMED derives patient and non-patient 
care dollars, CHAMPUS, and MILPERS will be presented in the following section.) 
However, only the patient care dollars serve as the numerator in the BUMED' s basic 
capitation formula. The denominator is based on estimates of eligible population derived 
from the Resource Planning and Analysis System (RAPS). RAPS projects military 
beneficiary population by beneficiary category and geographic area. 
To determine the capitated rates for Category II and Category III, the total amount 
expended for direct care O&M, CHAMPUS, and MILPERS dollars for each category is 
divided by each respective population base. However, as pointed out by one of 
BUMED's Budget Analysts, this figure does not contain fixed and administrative costs 
(Sullivan, personal communication, August 1996). 
Another difference between the Health Affairs and BUMED's capitation-based 
resource allocation approach deals with the way BUMED apportions the DHP funds 
down to its activities. Only the direct care O&M and the other business operating funds 
(OBOS) are actually apportioned down to the MTF level as part of the activity's EOB. 
As a control measure, BUMED does not allocate MILPERS, CHAMPUS and Other 
Procurement (OP) dollars below the claimant level (Sullivan, personal communication, 
1996). Consequently, only target figures, in dollar amounts, are assigned for MILPERS 
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and CHAMPUS funding for each MTF. The OP account is centrally managed by 
BUMED. It is used to purchase investment equipment. Sometimes, BUMED distributes 
OP dollars down to the MTF level on an as needed basis, and only after the activity has 
provided the necessary justification for the requirement and BUMED has validated the 
activity's requests. 
1. Direct Care Dollars 
The starting point for the calculation of direct care O&M dollars is patient care 
dollars per beneficiary contained in the BUMED's AWARE program. These estimates 
and ratios serve as the basis for allocating funds to each activity. (The AWARE program 
and other information systems that support the implementation of a capitation-based 
financing system will be discussed later in this chapter). The patient care dollars in the 
AWARE program include direct care, supplemental care, pharmacy, radiology, and 
laboratory dollars. BUMED considers these as variable costs. This value (used as 
dollars per beneficiary) is multiplied by the eligible beneficiary population for the new 
fiscal year. (BUMED Memorandum, 15 June 1994) 
Adjustments for one-time costs are applied to the result of the calculations 
discussed above. After calculating the inflation rate, the result is the total patient care 
dollars for the new fiscal year. 
2. Nonpatient Care Dollars 
Nonpatient care dollars are also managed using the AWARE program. In the 
allocation process, these are treated as fixed costs and are not capitated based upon 
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changes in population. Adjustments (e.g., one-time costs, functional transfers, and 
others) and inflation are applied to produce a total nonpatient care dollar amount for the 
fiscal year. (BUMED Memorandum, 15 June 1994) 
In BUMED's capitation model, the activity's total expense operating budget 
(EOB) is reduced for the Maintenance and Repair (M2/R2) dollars. The M2/R2 dollars, 
just like the other procurement (OP) account, are centrally managed by BUMED and 
considered a one-time incremental adjustment for subordinate activities. The M2/R2 
dollars are funds appropriated for the activity or MTF for special repair and alteration 
projects that are not in the commanding officer's local authority. (Sullivan, personal 
communication, 8 November 1996) 
3. CHAMPUS Dollars 
The starting point for the calculation of CHAMPUS dollar targets is the 
CHAMPUS dollars per eligible beneficiary contained in the AWARE program. This 
provides the latest estimates and ratios for allocating targets to each field activity. 
Subsequently, the CHAMPUS cost identified for the activity is divided by the eligible 
beneficiary population (using the most current RAPS population estimates) to determine 
the CHAMPUS capitated rate. The CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries are figures taken 
from RAPS, and do not include active duty beneficiaries and persons over 65 years of 
age. To determine the CHAMPUS targets for the new fiscal year, the rate calculated 
above is multiplied by the inflation rate, then the result is multiplied by the latest RAPS 
population estimates. (Sullivan, personal communication, 8 November 1996) 
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As Managed Care Support (MCS) contracts come on-line, the calculations for 
CHAMPUS targets for the MTF in that region will be done differently. Instead of using 
CHAMPUS data in the AWARE program, CHAMPUS targets for the MTFs that have 
MCS contracts will be based on the Regional Paid Management Data Report (RPMDR). 
(Sullivan, personal communication, 8 November 1996) 
4. MILPERS Dollars 
The starting point for the calculation of the military personnel (MILPERS) dollar 
targets is the onboard strength of each activity at the end of the fiscal year. The dollar 
amounts are based on military personnel costs ("expensed") at the end of the fiscal year 
(Sullivan, personal communication, 8 November 1996). 
The onboard strength is adjusted for billet changes known from the previous 
fiscal year and the dollar amount is also adjusted for the following fiscal year pay 
increase. Officer and enlisted billets and dollar targets are adjusted to more accurately 
reflect changes in the cost of military personnel. (BUMED Memorandum, 15 June 1994) 
In addition, billet changes are used to adjust the officer and enlisted onboard 
strength in each fiscal year. These changes are then reflected as a result of"approved" 
changes from the Bureau ofPersonnel's (BUPERS) billet file. Next, the dollar targets are 
calculated by using the DoD's Composite Pay Rates per person for officers and enlisted 
personnel, and then totaled to obtain a target amount for the fiscal year. (BUMED 
Memorandum, 15 June 1994) 
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B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT BUMED'S CAPITATION MODEL 
Good data is crucial to implementing a capitation-based resource allocation 
model. MTF commanders and military medical managers need ready access to a high-
quality data system that tracks beneficiaries, their numbers, demographics, and health 
care status. Military managers also need detailed and timely data on use patterns, patient 
case-mix, and individual physician practices. 
The following are examples of current systems available to support the 
implementation ofthe modified capitation-based resource allocation process: 
1. BUMED's Annual Work and Resource Evaluation (AWARE) 
Program 
As stated earlier, BUMED uses data in the Annual Work and Resource Evaluation 
(AWARE) program as a starting point in its modified capitation model allocation 
process. The AWARE program was designed and developed by individuals from 
BUMED's Resource/Comptroller Directorate. Its primary objective is to provide 
financial and workload data in a time series format (12 month moving period) for use in 
trend and performance analysis. AWARE provides other information to support 
performance analysis of an activity or MTF, such as staffing, beneficiary population, 
beneficiary ratios, and medical workload per unit ratios. Table 4.2 summarizes data 
contained in the AWARE program. 
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Element Measurement Source 
Workload Medical Work Units (MWU) Standard Expense and 
Accounting Reporting 
System (SEARS) 
Obligations Dollars Standard Accounting and 
Reporting System - Field 
Level (STARS-FL) 
Beneficiary Population Eligibles RAPS 
Military Staff Onboard Strength BUPERS 
Peer Group Comparisons Ratios, Standard Deviations, Various Management 
Percent variance Information Systems 
Table 4.3: Summary of A WARE Datau 
2. Composite Health Care System (CHCS) 
The Composite Health Care System (CHCS) is a comprehensive medical 
information system designed and developed to provide automated support to MTFs 
throughout the world. Composed of integrated modules that are activated either together 
or independently, this system supports high volume work areas within MTFs and 
enhances communication between support areas. 
CHCS supports a wide range of hospital functions, such as pharmacy, laboratory, 
patient administration, and physician orders. A managed care program module has been 
designed specifically to support TRICARE. This module is designed to track the 
enrollment of beneficiaries in the Prime option, patient appointment bookings and patient 
referrals. (GAO, 28 March 1995) 
12source: Sullivan, L. M., (MED-lllA), Briefing Paper 
for BUMED's Resource Conference, "POM-98 Baseline," 24 May 
1996. 
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3. Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System/Expense 
Assignment System Version ill (MEPRS/EAS ill) 
The Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System/Expense Assignment 
System Version III (MEPRS/EAS Ill) provides uniform reporting of workload, 
personnel, obligation and expense data by MTF for support analyses such as "make 
versus buy" decisions. MEPRS is the only system that links financial workload and 
manpower data in a similar manner among the three Services. 
There are six major areas of care identified within MEPRS. Each of the six major 
areas is considered a specialty account, or "work center." These work centers perform 
the health care services and collect the MEPRS workload data. MEPRS data are 
periodically compiled by designated individuals in each work center and forwarded to the 
command's central collection point for data processing. 
MEPRS ensures that the l\1HSS as a whole utilizes uniform accounting principles, 
standardized terminology, uniform work performance indicators, common classification 
of expenses by work center, and a common cost assignment methodology (BUMED 
Memorandum, undated). Currently, MEPRS cost account codes are assigned to a 
specific capitation category and are used to extract direct care O&M and MILPERS 
expense data to reflect capitation Category III costs. 
4. Resource Analysis and Planning System (RAPS) 
Under the capitation-based resource allocation model, the Services use "eligible" 
beneficiaries in their basic formula. They determine the average eligible population 
through the use of the RAPS database. As mentioned earlier, RAPS projects military 
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beneficiary population by beneficiary category and geographic area. It translates 
population projections into utilization and associated costs. RAPS provides a modeling 
and analytical tool to forecast military health care beneficiary population, workload, and 
costs. The model enables users to estimate and analyze the impact of alternative 
assumptions and policy decisions on resource requirements. 
5. Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) 
The Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) is a computer 
based enrollment/eligibility system used to verify entitlement to a majority of DoD 
services, including eligibility for health care. Registration in DEERS is an MHSS 
requirement, regardless of the TRICARE benefit option chosen. Eligibility for health 
care benefits in DEERS is verified prior to the processing of any CHAMPUS and 
TRICARE claims (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 14 March 1995). DEERS supports the 
Services' capitation-based resource allocation model in the determination of the eligible 
beneficiary population. 
6. Defense Medical Information System (DMIS) 
The Defense Medical Information System (DMIS) provides a centralized and 
integrated database ofMHSS beneficiary population, direct care cost and workload, 
nonavailability statements (NAS), MTF staffing (MEPRS) data, facilities data, civilian 
norms data, and Uniformed Service Treatment Facility information. DMIS also projects 
workload and population through RAPS and through requests for special duties. "DMIS 
is a centralized, non-deployed set of applications software and data bases that supports 
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the collection, integration, validation, distribution, and analysis ofMHSS data 
concerning population, cost, utilization, and medical treatment data." (OASD(HA) 
Memorandum, 23 July 1993) 
DMIS provides MTFs and Lead Agents with eligible and user beneficiary 
population numbers for a defined catchment area through the use ofRAPS database. As 
mentioned in previous chapter, in the Services' capitation model, the denominator is 
based on "eligibles," whereas Health Affairs uses "users" in its basic equation. 
7. Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System for Open System 
Environment (RCMAS-OSE) 
The Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System for Open System Environment 
(RCMAS-OSE) provides patient-level inpatient utilization statistics and norms (MHSS 
and civilian) for analysis and evaluation. It contains length of stay, discharge rates, case-
mix, non-availability statements (NAS), CHAMPUS charges and population. RCMAS-
OSE adjusts for age, gender, and case-mix when analyzing beneficiary categories by 
Diagnoses Related Groups (DRGs). 
RCMAS provides MTFs, intermediate commands (e.g., HSO), Service 
headquarters (e.g., BUMED) and Health Affairs access to clinical and management 
information. RCMAS uses direct care and CHAMPUS population and clinical data to 
provide statistics of observed versus expected workload and utilization trends 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 July 1993). In addition, RCMAS provides data for the 
Services to calculate the "cross over'' population (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 April 
1996). (See Appendix C for a detailed discussion on "cross over'' calculation.) Cross-
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over calculations are computed at the Service level and used to adjust the activity's total 
capitated budget. 
8. Catchment Area Billing Report (CABR) 
The Catchment Area Billing Report (CABR) provides CHAMPUS billing at the 
catchment area level. This system allows MTF commanders, who will be responsible for 
the execution of their CHAMPUS funds once the TRICARE Support Contracts are in 
placed, to monitor CHAMPUS expenditures. 
For the Navy, the Regional Paid Data Management Report (RPDMR) and the 
CABR are used as a benchmark for establishing a target for CHAMPUS claims based on 
past performance. Both reports are inputted into the AWARE program and serve as the 
starting point for the calculation of CHAMPUS dollar targets. CHAMPUS cost is part of 
the total costs for capitation Category ITI. 
9. Regional Paid Data Management Report (RPDMR) 
The Regional Paid Data Management Report (RPDMR) provides BUMED and 
the MTF commanders expense data by catchment area showing the benefits being paid 
by the Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(OCHAMPUS). This report is the primary tool by which MTF commanders can track the 
TRICARE funds being expensed in their catchment area (OCHAMPUS actually paying a 
claim). RPDMR enhances the Catchment Area Billing Report (CABR) by showing the 
actual amount of funds collected by civilian sector providers for medical services. 
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Capitation Category ill contains approximately 75 percent ofDHP resources and 
is divided into three subcategories: in-house direct care, CHAMPUS, and other support 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 16 May 1996). RPDMR and CABR are currently used to 
determine the total CHAMPUS costs. 
C. READINESS-FOCUSED CAPITATION 
The overriding purpose of the military health care system is to be ready in time of 
war. This objective is embodied in the Navy Medical Department Strategic Plan and 
articulated in policy papers and working documents such as BUMED' s POM-98 Strategy 
(BUMED Paper, 13 October 1995). The theme presented in this literature is that 
"readiness is true north." This means that the first priority for BUMED is to capture and 
finance medical readiness costs, then support infrastructure and health benefit programs. 
To ensure readiness, priorities should be reviewed and "re-ranked" or re-ordered as 
needed, and the resources should be shifted accordingly." (Foster, (N-931), Briefing 
Paper, 30 April1995) 
As BUMED and OASD(HA) continue to refine their ability to respond to new 
mission requirements associated with changing threats in a new world order, and at the 
same time strive to contain costs in a constrained budget environment, medical readiness 
will undoubtedly play a significant role in future medical funding requirements. 
According to Lanier, one of the most pressing challenges facing military health care 
managers is how to best balance resources to provide timely access and quality care to 
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the peacetime health benefit mission as well as comply with medical readiness 
requirements (Lanier, 1995, p. 126). BUMED is currently experiencing this challenge. 
The Navy Surgeon General and the Navy Medical Department have been under 
continuous pressures to comply with various readiness requirements for the past four 
years from the Secretary of the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress. Their main 
concern is how medical readiness will support the unique roles and missions of the 
Military Departments during military operations throughout the operational spectrum into 
the next century (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 8 June 1994). 
A similar issue was evident during the GulfWar. During Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, it was observed that many Navy medical personnel were 
unprepared to perform their mission in the operating environment (GAO, 22 March 
1995). After the Gulf War, the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Navy, 
in coordination with the OASD(HA), to reevaluate the Navy training requirements for 
readiness according to the requirements stated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). 
The major objective of this directive is to bring Navy medical personnel into compliance 
with DPG and DoN requirements. The Defense Planning Guidance of23 May 1994, Part 
III.B.3, maintains that the Navy medical readiness status is below the level specified in 
its own instruction as set forth in BUMEDINST 6440.5A (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 8 
June 1994). 
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To bring Navy medical personnel into compliance with DPG and DoN 
requirements, BUMED presented several options to OASD(HA). These alternatives 
include: 
• For the Navy/Marine Corps line to increase the training infrastructure to 
accommodate Navy medical personnel readiness requirements. 
• For the Navy/Marine Corps line to give increased priority and increased 
training position quotas to Navy medical department personnel. 
• Additional funding or transfer or funds to BUMED in order to achieve the 
objectives of Readiness Requirements (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 8 June 
1994). 
In addition, as a consequence of the increasing pressure from both the SECNA V 
and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office ofthe Surgeon General (N-931) developed and 
proposed to OASD(HA) an alternative process for allocating DHP dollars and resources 
to each Service, currently known as "readiness-focused" capitation. Developed by the 
analysts and budget programmers from the Navy Medical Finance Division (N-931) of 
the Chief ofNaval Operations, "readiness-focused" capitation was used as a resource 
programming, planning and budgeting strategy for POM-98 (Foster, S. E., personal 
communication, 13 May 1996). 
According to Foster (N-931), the Navy's position throughout POM-98 
development was to recognize the relationship between the CONUS health care system 
and the readiness mission. Budget programmers from N-931 developed a methodology 
to isolate the cost of readiness from the benefit mission. Their objective was to indicate 
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to Health Affairs that the infrastructure required to support readiness training for medical 
personnel assigned to CONUS hospitals should be considered part of readiness costs. 
(Foster, DHP POM-98 Issue Paper, 1995) Although the infrastructure required to 
support readiness training in CONUS hospitals also supports the health care benefit 
mission by delivering care to the non-active duty beneficiaries, these readiness costs are 
driven by the size of active duty and medical forces, and not by the size of the general 
beneficiary population. If this infrastructure is not in place, the care for the non-active 
duty beneficiaries would have to be purchased as an entitlement. (Foster, DHP POM-98 
Issue Paper, 1995) 
Readiness-focused capitation uses capitation categories similar to those used by 
Health Affairs, such as Category I, Category ITA, Category IIB, and Category III. Also, 
"readiness-focused" capitation uses the same defined population ("users") as the 
denominator in its basic capitation model. The flow ofDHP resources in "readiness-
focused" capitation is illustrated in Figure 9. The breakout of readiness-focused 
capitation categories is as follows: 
• Category I- OCONUS Non-capitated Support 
• Category IT - Military Medical Unique Function 
• Category InA (MILPERS) - THCSRR13 Manpower 
13The Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirements 
(THCSRR) model was developed by N-931 to determine the 
.appropriate mix of health care providers needed to support 
the readiness mission. The THCSRR model has two main 
components. The first component identifies active duty 
manpower readiness requirements necessary to complete both 
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• Category IllA (O&M)- Readiness Facility Operations 
• Category IIIB (MILPERS) -Non-THCSRR Manpower 
• Category IIIB (O&M) - Direct Care System/Managed Care 
~ Resonrcing for Readiness 
\f,/'J i ~Strategic AUocation of Limited 
~-- '~ Resources 
Cati l\~~ 
OCO.'IIUS d. Ncc...Cop. Suppert $ s 
Cat II <I' $~ •s 
Militory Mcdi~sl !::ili~Fur-«ion \ '; .. 
Cat lilA MPf\\~s 
1'HCSRR IJaro:?O""" J s ": 
Cat lilA O&M~;s 






Figure 8: Flow ofDHP Funds Under "Readiness-Focused" Capitation14 
wartime and day-to-day operational support missions. The 
second component includes the sustainment requirements 
needed to maintain the readiness manpower requirements for 
future years. (Weber, T., September 1994} 
14Source: Foster, S. E., (N-931}, Briefing Paper, 
Defense Health Program for POM-98, Navy Medicine: "Readiness 
is True North," 30 April 1995. 
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Under the "readiness-focused" capitation model, readiness determines the 
allocation ofDHP resources. This model provides an opportunity for budget 
programmers to allocate resources with readiness as the top priority, build programs to 
support readiness, and re-align resources for additional readiness training requirements. 
It also assumes that CONUS-based medical infrastructure supports medical readiness 
training and that these facilities provide the rotation base for OCONUS and other 
operational tours (Foster, S. E., personal communication, 13 May 1996). 
However, there are two major deviations from the Health Affairs' modified 
capitation model. First, the readiness-focused capitation model splits Category III into 
Categmy IliA (Readiness Facility Operations) and Categmy IIIB (Direct Care 
System/Managed Care Contracts). In a readiness-focused capitation approach, the health 
care continuum consists of "readiness costs" on one side and benefit costs or the "benefit 
mission" on the other. The cost of readiness includes the direct care system, training, and 
all of the forward deployed infrastructure (e.g., fleet hospitals, FMF, OCONUS, 
I CONUS). The capitation-based resource allocation system used by Health Affairs, 
however, treats the direct care system and training as part of the benefit mission. (Foster, 
Briefing Paper, 30 April1995) 
Second, readiness-focused capitation recognizes and characterizes Navy CONUS 
MTFs that are "THCSRR-designated" as part of the readiness requirement. This means 
that both the manpower and all the fixed costs of maintaining these facilities are critical 
factors in financing a medical readiness system (Foster, Briefing Paper, 30 April1995). 
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1. Impact of Readiness-focused Capitation 
Readiness-focused capitation holds great promise for justifying the cost of 
medical readiness requirements. One of the consequences is that it shifts resources from 
Category III to Category I and Category II. This shift created several very complex and 
intricate issues affecting BUMED's budget submission for POM-98. One of these was 
that BUMED's total funding requirements did not produce an executable budget for 
POM-98. The shift in resources meant that part of the health care benefit mission, e.g., 
TRICARE support contracts, managed care and supplemental care programs, became 
unfunded requirements (Nudd, (N-931), personal communication, August 1996). 
In addition, due to limited DHP funds, any increase in BUMED' s funding 
resulting from readiness-focused capitation may come at the expense of the other 
Services' medical departments. Health Affairs, on the other hand, has a 
responsibility to ensure that the other Services' medical departments get their "fair share" 
ofDHP funds (Frederick, personal communication, 13 August 1996). 
a. Fixed Costs and Other Business Operating Costs 
Another argument for readiness-focused capitation is that it must take into 
account the fixed costs as well as other business operating support costs in determining 
the overall medical readiness cost. As mentioned in previous section, fixed costs are 
recurring costs that do not vary with changes in population. Most fixed costs belong to 
Category III. For the Navy in FY96, the aggregate total is close to $341 million 
(BUMED paper, 12 August 1996). Although Navy hospitals and clinics pay directly for 
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more types of base operating support costs than the Army and Air Force, all three 
services are capitated at essentially the same rate (BUMED Memorandum, 15 October 
1995, p. 18). 
b. CONUS Healthcare Readiness Infrastructure Sizing Model 
(CHRISM) 
As part ofBUMED' s efforts to address and comply with medical 
readiness requirements, it developed a plan to align CONUS MTFs according to their. 
respective role in support of overall medical readiness requirements. This plan is 
currently known as the "CONUS Healthcare Readiness Infrastructure Sizing Model" 
(CHRISM). Under this plan, some CONUS MTFs are considered part of the health care 
readiness infrastructure, referred to as "readiness-financed" MTFs. These MTFs get 
funding and staffing first (Foster, S. E., personal communication, 13 May 1996). Foster 
pointed out that all fixed costs for these MTFs should be considered as part of readiness 
costs. Figure 10 depicts BUMED's Total Readiness Alignment Plan. 
However, this argument has some drawbacks. Not all fixed costs in each 
MTF are directly related to the health care demands of the active duty force. Also, it is 
unlikely that all "costs of doing business" in an MTF can be directly attributed to 
medical readiness. Examples include the costs associated in running a child care center 
in an MTF which is located on its own installation, environmental compliance costs, and 
BUMED's so-called one-time, specialty projects. These types of costs must be captured 





Alternative Deployment Plan: 
Cross-Or anizational Teams 
JAX BREM LEJ PNDL GLKS PCLA BETH PORT SD 
Reserve Fleet/ Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Augmenting Personnel 
I I I I 
Fleet/FMF OCONUS MTF/ DTF Augmenting Personnel 
I I I 
Au~~:ment Rotation Base Medical and Dental Staff (Non-Augmenting) 





T-AR F R 
Split-
0 c So11rced 
R y 
T 
'* * '* '* * '* 
SPECIALTY TEAMS-JAX 
-
F 1-- F r;- F - F 1- F - F SPECIALTY TEAMS-BREM H F B H B H H B H B H B H R H A A A A A A R H c c c c c c SPECIALTY TEAMS-LEJ E R K K K K K K E R F F F F F F SPECIALTY TEAMS-PNDL s I J I B I L I p I G I p s E R L L L L L L 
L A L R L E L N L L L c SPECIALTY TEAMS-GLKS 
...._ 
X 1- E 1- J - D 1- K - L SPECIALTY T.EAMS-PCLA 
M L s A 
Source: OPNAV N931 
Figure 9: BUMED's Total Readiness Alignment Plan. Ref. "Foster, (N-931), 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview ofBUMED's capitation model and the 
information systems that are available to support the implementation of a capitation-
based financing system. It also addressed "readiness-focused" capitation concept, and its 
impact, as an alternative approach to programming, planning, and budgeting DHP funds 
in the future. 
The next chapter will provide a discussion of capitation and its impact on 
resource managers at the MTF level. Also, it will address some of the implementation 
issues in adopting a capitation-based financing system and how DoD is confronting these 
problems. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
A. GENERAL 
In a capitated system, cost management requires reducing both the volume of 
services and the cost per unit, while maintaining the quality of care and customer 
satisfaction. To achieve these goals, health care organizations strive to maintain the health 
of covered populations and provide medically appropriate services in the least intensive 
and most cost-effective setting. (Cerne, 1994, p. 23) 
The challenge of a successful transition to a capitated environment is to implement 
the necessary changes without jeopardizing the organization. Preparation for capitation 
should include: 
• Creating management and provider incentives; 
• Improving and integrating information systems; 
• Enhancing preventive services; 
• Measuring performance; 
• Establishing strong internal utilization management practice and protocols; 
• Integrating clinical services. (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 64) 
The point at which an organization makes the decision to move from a fee-for-
service payment system to capitation will vary depending on the organization's structure 
and its elements, complexities of the internal environment, and the multifaceted problems 
which arise when dealing with various constituents and stakeholders (Kleiman, 1996, p. 
40). To succeed in the transition to capitation, it is important that organizations: 
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• Develop an infrastructure that allows for management of the risks associated 
with capitation; 
• Convince providers that sharing risks in a partnership environment is a win/win 
arrangement; 
• Establish primary care provider networks that can manage the utilization of 
clinical services; 
• Provide access to health care services; 
• Recognize that total cost management is a significant goal. (Kleiman, 1996, p. 
41) 
To thrive in a health care environment dominated by capitated payments, health 
care organizations must take action before they are forced to do so by the health care 
market (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 69). By demonstrating that the organization can 
share a common commitment to comprehensive planning and managing in those areas 
mentioned above, and mutually enjoy the rewards that can result, health care organizations 
under capitation would gain greater control of their economic and strategic positions 
(Byrne, 1995, p. 41). 
B. MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE ADOPTION OF A CAPITATION-BASED 
APPROACH WITHIN THE MHSS 
According to Ceme, the transition to capitation begins when an organization 
rejects the traditional mind-set of dividing health care into hospital and physician 
components (Ceme, 1994, p. 29). Capitation is designed to force organizations to 
examine the entire spectrum of care, instead of just one component. It requires that the 
system determine the number of enrolled beneficiaries needed to support the current 
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structure and the mix of primary and specialty physicians for that population (Rahn, 1995, 
p. 103). 
Although a capitation-based resource allocation approach, along with the 
implementation of other TRICARE initiatives, promises to control costs and respond to 
changing military and health care priorities, there are numerous obstacles to achieving 
these goals. To answer one of the subsidiary research questions, this section will discuss 
the different obstacles to the adoption of a capitation-based resource allocation system 
within the MHSS. 
1. Incentives and Motivating Factor (Profit) 
To foster cost containment, we must be willing to share the fruits of these 
efforts with those most responsible for their realization. This means the 
implementation of innovative and effective benefits for the managers and 
providers who have daily responsibility for the decisions which determine 
resource utilization. (Rosenstein, 1991, p.313) 
The concept of economic incentives and their employment in the health care sector 
was discussed in Chapter II. The general idea was that economic incentives prompt 
economic behavior patterns on the part of physicians. In for-profit liMOs, compensation 
and incentive payments to providers were tied to productivity. To earn a profit, the HMO 
had an incentive for minimizing costs by reducing future demand for health care services. 
Management may wield profit as an incentive and control to keep costs in line. In private 
sector liMOs, profit may be retained and shared by the firm and the physicians practicing 
within the firm. 
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In comparison, the :MHSS lacks a consistent and sufficient set of management and 
operational incentives. In a military health care system, the focus is not on per capita 
costs, but rather on balancing a readiness requirement with the benefit mission. The 
readiness requirement diminishes the ability of the :MHSS to compete with the private 
sector. 
The :MHSS is not presently in a position to take advantage of the profit incentive 
since the organizational structure of the DoD precludes even a weak direct monetary 
incentive for active duty physicians and other active duty medical personnel. These 
:MHSS providers are salaried, and their compensation is the same regardless of the quality 
or quantity of the care rendered. They cannot exercise significant control over resources 
and they do not have any financial incentive to increase their productivity or limit the use 
of high cost procedures for additional financial remuneration. Contrary to the concept of 
capitation-based budgeting, no incentive structure exists among :MHSS providers to 
motivate cost consciousness (Kearn, Personal Communication, November 1996; GAO, 
1995; Lanier, 1993). 
One remedy was suggested by Edmund Chan, OASD(HA). Chan proposed a 
system of fringe benefits tied to performance for both providers and managers with the 
potential to discipline or relieve the latter for ineffective or unacceptable performance 
(Chan, Personal Communication, 1996). This proposal reflects and supports the direct 
relationship between incentives and performance. However, this initiative would require 
congressional action to amend certain laws or regulations, which is not an easy task to 
accomplish. 
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To generate additional revenue and create a profit incentive for the MTF, DoD has 
implemented an incentive similar to the private sector fee-for -service payment system that 
focuses on revenue generating workloads. This incentive is currently called the "third 
party collection" (TPC) program. It is designed to bill and collect from insurance 
companies for health care services provided at the MTF for active-duty family members, 
retirees, survivors and their family members with third party insurance coverage 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 13 August 1996). 
The collections from third party insurance companies are retained by the MTFs. 
This revenue is considered an addition to the MTF's operating budget. In addition, the 
MTF commander has the authority and flexibility to use the revenue from the TPC 
program to offset the operating costs of the program and to use the profit from this 
program as he or she sees fit to meet mission requirements (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 13 
August 1996). 
Locally, there is another factor that the MTF commander can use to foster or instill 
a cost-conscious attitude among active duty medical providers. Active duty health care 
providers' promotions are largely based upon their fitness reports or performance 
evaluations. Officer fitness reports and enlisted performance evaluations are completed by 
the MTF's Commanding Officer or his designated representatives. This allows the 
MTF commanders to influence the active duty providers to deliver care and use the 
appropriate resources in delivering care consistent with the commanding officer's goals. 
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2. Single Enrollment Plan and Inaccuracy in Population Data 
Under a capitation-based budgeting model, it is necessary to accurately predict the 
demand for services generated by the beneficiary population. In order to accomplish this, 
reliable data is required concerning the population being served and the rates at which 
services are being utilized by that population. (Kongstvedt, 1996, p. 73) An enrollment 
system, in conjunction with actuarial data, provides information critical to managed care. 
The implication with respect to this recommendation is that the enrollment system 
will accomplish more than a simple head count. Since the key to cost reductions 
according to HMO experience has been cost effective use of health care services, 
information on size of the served population alone will be of limited value (Rahn, 1995, 
1 08). The process of enrollment provides an opportunity to gather the demographic 
information necessary to ascertain probable utilization patterns and to predict resource 
needs more accurately (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 74). In addition, enrollment 
addresses the issue of access control. It establishes a commitment on the part of the 
patients or consumers to seek necessary services from within the system. 
Accordingly, the key to effective capitation financing within the MHSS is to be 
able to accurately determine the number and type of beneficiaries using the system. 
However, currently, there is no universal or single enrollment plan within the MHSS, and 
even the exact number ofMHSS eligible beneficiaries cannot be precisely determined 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 July 1993). 
Currently, TRICARE-Prime is the only program that mandates enrollment, and 
only for a limited segment of its delivery system beneficiaries. According to a 
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memorandum published by the OASD(HA), all active duty beneficiaries will be enrolled in 
TRICARE-Prime (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 23 July 1993). CHAMPUS-eligible 
beneficiaries are not required to enroll in this specific program and therefore retain their 
freedom to choose other health care alternatives. 
Through the use of various management information systems, such as the Defense 
Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), the Resource Analysis and Planning 
System (RAPS), and the Semiannual User Survey, DoD is trying to better understand its 
beneficiary population and the capacity required to serve that population. (The various 
information systems required to support the implementation of a capitation-based 
financing system within the MHSS was discussed in Chapter IV.) 
In the meantime, DoD has proposed a new concept, called "revised or alternative 
financing," which calls for a complete enrollment system. As currently planned, "revised 
or alternative financing" will be instituted for Regions 1, 2, and 5 (OASD(HA) 
Memorandum, Undated). The impact of this new financing concept or its influence on a 
capitation-based resource allocation approach within the MHSS is outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
3. Capitation and Management Information Systems 
To manage care in an integrated and capitated payment system, providers must be 
able to track patient care longitudinally, through all episodes of care and across time. 
Information must be available on physician office visits, specialist referrals, outpatient 
procedures performed, inpatient admissions, and follow-up physician visits. Integrated 
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clinical and financial information is necessary for capturing and extracting important data 
to document the cost and quality of patient care. (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 66) 
Information systems will ultimately be necessary to extract data to document cost 
and quality of care (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 66). The change from fee-for-service to 
capitated payment causes a dramatic change in financial record keeping (Zaharias, 1995, p. 
2). Fee-for-service systems require that patient encounters be documented and subsequent 
reports produced for the services rendered. Capitation payment systems require more, 
namely frequent tallies of enrollment, revenue and cost, followed by accurate tracking of 
services rendered throughout the month (Zaharias, 1995, p. 3). 
One of the most complex problems encountered in the transition to capitation is 
the development of a patient level cost accounting module (Mechanic and Aiken, 1994, p. 
52). According to Kolb and Horowitz, as the search for cost-effective treatment protocols 
intensifies, an organization must know the relative cost of various procedures based on 
resource utilization rather than antiquated "cost-to-charge" ratios (Kolb & Horowitz, 
1995, p. 66). This means that the health care delivery system must have the ability to 
develop cost information on each patient or group of patients and service type. In 
addition, accurate cost data should be figured by type of service and should be broken out 
into components of fixed and variable costs. These data help demonstrate to the 
providers, patients, and other stakeholders the quality and efficiency with which care has 
been delivered. 
MTF commanders, health care managers, and providers need to be able to keep 
track of costs by patient, to monitor and possibly limit the volume of services, to monitor 
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service expenditures, and describe and cost,out creative services for keeping patients out 
of the hospital. Bergman pointed out that knowing this cost is critical because cost 
overruns place the organization at financial risk (Bergman, 1994, p. 67). Because MTFs 
receive fixed amounts of funding to deliver their services, they require accurate cost data 
to function effectively under capitation. This data should include information on medical 
service costs and hospital support costs. For example, fixed, administrative, and other 
operating costs could be tracked systematically. This information, coupled with the costs 
of direct and indirect patient care services, could serve as a benchmark for measuring 
productivity improvements. 
Equally important, data about utilization and outcomes are needed to educate 
physicians about their practice patterns, especially when the data is severity-adjusted. 
Under capitation, an organization must integrate and coordinate the various services 
patients need and must align incentives to encourage appropriate utilization from all 
providers (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 67). 
DoD and BUMED use several information systems to support a capitation-based 
budgeting system. Unfortunately, none of these information systems are as robust or well-
integrated as they should be. A common problem involves the dissemination of data 
acquired from these various information systems. Most of the data is traditionally 
presented to the executive and administrative staff. However, the data do not always get 
to the medical providers, who could benefit from the information contained in various 
reports (Scaramozzino, Personal Communication, 25 November 1996). Medical 
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providers require accurate and timely information to change their practice patterns and 
effectively manage the use of health services resources. 
This lack of adequate and timely information on health care has impeded several 
DoD initiatives to provide health care more cost effectively (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 
23 July 1993). In an attempt to capture both financial and workload data into one 
integrated system, DoD developed a comprehensive medical information system, currently 
known as the "Composite Health Care System" (CHCS). CHCS is comprised of various 
modules to support hospital functions and to capture critical information needed to 
analyze resource consumption and utilization management throughout the continuum of 
care. (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 28 March 1995) 
However, CHCS is not fully functional in several DoD medical sites, and has 
experienced some technical and implementation delays. In addition, designers of the 
CHCS have failed to incorporate a patient cost level accounting system which is critical 
in identifying the per capita cost of providing care to the defined population with a 
significant degree of accuracy. 
4. Shift in Emphasis from Inpatient to Outpatient Care and Preventive 
Services 
One way that capitation reverses the logic in health care is by shifting the focus of 
care from treating illness to maintaining wellness (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 67). In a 
fee-for-service system, providers are paid only for taking care of patients when they are 
sick; in a capitation system, the financial well-being of providers varies directly with the 
health of the enrolled population. Therefore, health care organizations have a financial 
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incentive to invest in patient education, early disease detection, and other preventive 
services. 
This requires a significant attitudinal change, a shift in emphasis from inpatient to 
outpatient care, and a focus on high quality, cost-effective preventive care (Ceme, 1994, 
p. 31 ). In general, this means changing the focus toward significantly reducing 
admissions, especially among patients requiring resource-intensive care. 
Kolb and Horowitz noted that liMOs stress increased use of preventive outpatient 
care to reduce hospitalization costs (Kolb & Horowitz, 1995, p. 65). Other methods used 
by different private sector liMOs include pre-admission certification, placing providers at 
risk for total utilization (including ancillary services as well as hospital care), and 
restrictions on the supply of hospital beds, thereby apparently reducing the number of 
discretionary cases that can be handled (Kleiman, 1996, p. 40). 
DoD adopted capitation as the basic financial foundation for transition into 
managed care. This is a major change from the way the MHSS previously obtained their 
resources. However, it also demands a change in the attitude of many of the health care 
providers from a mind set of"treating illness to maintaining wellness" (BUMED 
Memorandum, 13 October 1995). Treatment of acute or chronic illness requires more 
utilization of resources and is more expensive than prevention. Capitation encourages the 
health care system to use increased preventive health care, primary care, patient education, 
and self-care to reduce acute illness. 
DoD is actively involved in enhancing preventive services and boosting continuing 
education to promote wellness and the health of its beneficiaries. In developing strategies 
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to address this issue, DoD implemented TRICARE Program goals for preventive services 
based on established scientific evidence. The establishment of clinical preventive services 
such as mammography, pap smears, eye examinations, immunizations, and screening blood 
levels for high-risk illnesses, are considered part of care for primary care services within 
DoD. (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 22 February 1994) 
Patient and provider education is an essential part of compliance with practice 
guidelines for preventive clinical services. Patients need to be informed about specific 
services they need. On the other hand, providers need to know special risk group 
indications for the specific services that are needed by their beneficiary population. 
In support of DoD's initiatives, Navy medicine has developed its own series of 
specific and interrelated responses toward promoting wellness and enhancing preventive 
services. Examples ofBUMED's initiatives are as follows: 
• Establishment of more wellness centers/clinics; 
• Re-engineering of the physical fitness program toward prevention of injuries 
rather than treating them after they occur; 
• Re-engineering of"sick-call" structure and procedures by taking health care 
providers to the "deckplate"; 
• Establishment of a host of health promotion activities, such as nutrition 
identification systems at local commissaries, and health promotion weeks; 
(BUMED Paper, 13 October 1995) 
• Emphasizing wellness and prevention in the Navy's Surgeon General Monthly 
Situation Report (SITREP) to all Navy MTF commanders and medical 
department staff 
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Enhancing preventive services has been shown to produce significant long-term 
savings. In turn, it may very well help attain DoD's objective of containing or reducing 
the MHSS overall health care costs. 
C. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
There are several other implementation issues raised by the three Military Medical 
Departments that deserve further review. These include the availability of accurate and 
timely data, prevention of the shifting of workloads between MTFs, the role of fixed costs 
in the basic capitation formula, and the lack of provider involvement. 
1. Incomplete and Inaccurate Data 
Health Affairs has taken steps to streamline its automated information systems 
processes, eliminate duplication, and standardize where possible. However, Military 
Medical Department representatives have expressed their concern about the accuracy and 
completeness of data that was derived from various management information systems. 
For example, a representative from the Lead Agent for Region 9 commented that a review 
of recent referral data provided by the Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System (RCMAS) 
indicated that several patients were referred from a CONUS MTF to an MTF in Germany. 
This referral is most unusual, if not highly unlikely, because CONUS MTFs do not refer 
patients to an OCONUS activity (Cox, P., Personal Communication, 18 September 1996). 
Another concern regarding RCMAS is the incompleteness of data. Several factors 
could contribute to this, such as delays in the MTF reporting due to continued updating of 
patient records and possibly delays in receiving CHAMPUS data. CHAMPUS-eligible 
beneficiaries who incurred hospitalization (inpatient) bills have up to one year after 
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discharge to file a claim. Thus, it takes time to gather and validate the data received at the 
respective Services' medical headquarters. Consequently, RCMAS data is usually 
incomplete and one to two months behind in providing up-to-date information. (Cox, P., 
Personal Communication, 18 September 1996) 
Data accuracy is a problem affecting the Medical Expense Performance and 
Reporting System (MEPRS). :MEPRS data allows an MTF to determine costs at the work 
center level. A list of:MEPRS codes is currently used to extract direct care O&M expense 
data from the :MEPRS Central database. However, this list does not accurately reflect all 
capitation Category ill costs. There are several MEPRS codes that are presently assigned 
to Category ill that belongs to other capitation categories (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 27 
August 1996). 
Another example of data inconsistency between Health Affairs and the Services 
involves the determination of:JMILPERS costs. Currently, Health Affairs calculates 
:JMILPERS costs by multiplying the assigned full-time equivalent (PTE) of active duty 
personnel from :MEPRS by two different rates (one for officers and one for enlisted), 
based on average pay. But this method does not produce costs which match those in 
:MEPRS at the activity level or with those reported in the medical headquarters from their 
MTFs (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 27 August 1996). For example, BUMED and its 
activities use the DoD's Composite Pay Rate Schedule for computing :JMILPERS costs. 
One of the problems associated with population projection involves beneficiaries 
using the outlying medical branch clinics, especially those outside the MTF's 40-mile 
catchment area. Parent commands with clinics outside the catchment area will account for 
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the costs of operating those clinics, but will not get credit for the non-catchment area 
population. For these facilities, costs will not align with population, and their capitated 
rates will be inflated. Due to inconsistencies in determining patient population, calculation 
of capitated rates will be different between Health Affairs and the Services. (OASD(HA) 
Memorandum, 27 August 1996) 
Health Affairs recognizes the deficiencies in the current information systems and 
the inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data contained in the various automated 
information systems. Senior leaders in Health Affairs are determined to make the 
necessary modifications to existing systems and to acquire new information systems that 
will be required to support a capitation-based financing concept (Chan, Personal 
Communication, 8 August 1996). 
2. Preventing the Shifting of Workload to Another MTF. 
Under the current modified capitation resourcing methodology, an MTF 
commander is responsible and funded for providing health services to a defined but not 
enrolled population. In this type of capitated financing system, the MTF commander 
assumes responsibility for providing health services to a defined population, in return for a 
fixed amount per beneficiary. A capitated budget helps ensure that MTF commanders use 
limited resources economically. If the funds received by MTF commanders are based 
upon the number of eligible beneficiaries in their catchment area, the incentive to perform 
unnecessary care should be eliminated. 
However, in military medicine, the user population of an MTF does not necessarily 
come from a defined catchment area. Military beneficiaries are not enrolled in the same 
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fashion as in civilian managed care systems, i.e., they are able to go to any MTF for 
treatment. Thus, beneficiaries may consume resources for which the MTF is not receiving 
capitated funds. 
Thus, under the capitation-based budgeting system adopted within the MHSS, 
reducing workloads can result in increasing a commander's discretionary funds. This 
establishes an incentive to shift workloads to other MTFs at no cost to their operating 
budget. In an ideal situation, the MTF commander responsible for these users would 
make a transfer payment to the facility providing the care. But reimbursement for referral 
care almost never occurs. 
Under DoD's modified capitation model, if more work is accomplished at an MTF, 
no additional funds will come. On the other hand, if less work is accomplished, the MTF 
can realize savings on a temporary basis. Thus, there is an incentive to shift workloads to 
other components of the MHSS. This could be easily accomplished by transferring or 
referring workload that traditionally is covered by CHAMPUS to other tertiary care 
MTFs. This should result in the transfer of funds from the referring MTF to the MTF 
where care was actually provided. In other words, funds should go to where the care is 
provided. However, this transfer of funds does not usually occur, especially among MTFs 
in the same branch of service (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 17 September 1993). 
One way to shed in-house workloads is by limiting the types of drugs in the MTF's 
pharmaceutical formulary. A pharmacy formulary is a list of all the pharmaceuticals, drugs 
and other medicinal items that the hospital would carry in its pharmacy. Limiting the 
formulary can force patients to fill their prescriptions in the civilian sector, which means 
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increased out-of-pocket expenses for the beneficiaries and increased cost to the 
government (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 21 June 1994). 
Another example where MTFs could reduce workload without significantly 
affecting their operating budget involves referring high risk patients to specialized 
treatment facilities (STS) for certain high technology or high cost procedures. Currently, 
to determine an MTF's capitated budget, historical costs and workload data are utilized 
with prospective computation of various capitation categories. Thus, MTFs which 
provided and received referral services in the past are already resourced for those services 
at the historical level. For example, because ofhistorical workload level, Hospital A was 
resourced for 100 patients referred from other MTFs, but not resourced for any patients 
beyond those 100 already in its base. Any additional referrals could adversely affect its 
operating budget and result in "windfall profits" to referring facilities. 
To discourage or prevent workload shifting, DoD adopted an innovative measure, 
currently known as "transfer payments" in FY95. Transfer payments are unique to the 
military and not a factor in private sector capitation. Transfer payments are computed and 
processed at the headquarters level of the three military health services. This avoids local 
MTFs having to reimburse other MTFs within the same parent service for "cross overs." 
Currently, transfer payments cover inpatient services only. Administrative and logistical 
problems have delayed implementation of this mechanism, and no transfers between MTFs 
or Services have occurred as a result of this policy (Portis, A., Thesis Paper, June 1996). 
To manage referrals and prevent workload shifting, DoD is enlisting the help of the 
Lead Agents. As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the responsibilities of the Lead 
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Agent is to coordinate health care services within each TRICARE region. Specifically, 
DoD mandated that the Lead Agents will be responsible for sorting out the referral 
patterns for ambulatory care within their region (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 9 September 
1993). As a result of this initiative, Lead Agents will become a crucial link among MTFs 
in coordinating the need for patient referrals. 
3. Exclusion of Fixed Costs in the MHSS Capitation Model 
If the goal of cost containment is to be achieved, a capitated budget must 
accurately reflect the total cost of operations (Kolb and Horowitz, 1995, p. 65). Under 
capitation, the capitated budget should necessarily include the costs of financing all health 
care programs, including all fixed and administrative costs. In private sector capitation, 
fixed, administrative and other business operating costs are part of the capitation payment. 
Within the MHSS capitation model, however, fixed and other business operating 
support costs are not considered in determining the capitated rate. Fixed costs are not 
capitated because, according to senior leaders from Health Affairs and the three Military 
Medical Departments, they do not vary with changes in the population. Some fixed costs 
may have been included in the Health Affairs allocation ofDHP operations and 
maintenance (O&M) funds down to the Services level; however, they are priced 
programmatically (i.e., based on historical cost plus inflation), to the extent possible. 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 12 August 1996) 
In August 1996, OASD(HA) asked the three Military Medical Departments to 
identify representatives to form a working group to address the fixed cost issue. The goal 
of the working group was to review the capitation model and to determine if there are 
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fixed costs included in the model which should be removed and calculated at a different 
rate (i.e., fixed rate formula).· This was a second attempt to resolve this particular issue. 
The first attempt failed because the Services could not agree on working definitions of 
fixed costs based on the data found in the three Services' accounting systems. 
(OASD(HA) Memorandum, 12 August 1996) 
According to the report of the OASD(HA) Fixed Costs Working Group, some 
fixed costs are included in Health Affairs' current capitation financing model. A majority 
of these costs are in Capitation Category Til, and include base operations, environmental 
and specialty items in each Service. However, there was no consensus on recommending 
changes to the model. While the Navy recommended changes in the allocation 
methodology, the Army recommended no changes, and the Air Force saw little benefit 
from any change. (OASD(HA) Memorandum, 12 August 1996) 
The Air Force representative to the Working Group stated that both fixed and 
variable costs need to be managed to provide cost-effective health care for the population 
served. Fixed costs may not vary due to population changes in the short run, but they do 
not remain constant, due to changes to health care delivery strategies adopted and 
implemented by senior leaders within the MHSS. However, some fixed costs may be 
considered semi-variable in nature. In the long term, for planning and budgeting 
purposes, these costs will be variable and should be treated as such. (OASD(HA) 
Memorandum, 12 August 1996) 
If Health Affairs and the three Services continually segregate a portion of 
operating costs (i.e., fixed costs) within the capitation model, and in essence make them 
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uncontrollable, they effectively preclude the opportunity for health care managers and 
providers to make those cost-effective tradeoffs necessary to attain cost containment 
goals. If fixed costs are not included in the determination of capitated rates, then the 
incentive to implement cost containment initiatives is minimized. 
4. Physician Involvement in Transition to Capitation 
To mold a capitation-based payment mechanism into a functional tool, it must 
solicit and incorporate the participation of the physicians. Rosenstein argues that the first 
change must involve physicians, who control and manage the use of health services 
(Rosenstein, 1991, p. 325). Byrne notes that for capitation to work, physicians must be 
involved from the "get-go" (Byrne, 1995, p. 60). Byrne also stated that the most 
successful capitation models are "physician-driven." By working together, health care 
executives and physicians can create operating systems based on capitated payment 
approach (p. 61). 
This requires a lot of trust, understanding, information building, data analysis and 
presentation, and education. However, educational programs should not just be limited to 
physicians, but should also include residents and house staff, department managers, 
administration, ancillary departments, nursing and other parties interested in improving the 
cost efficiency of medical care (Mechanic and Aiken, 1994, p. 72). 
In private sector liMOs that employ a capitated payment mechanism, medical 
directors are in the "driver's seat" to make sound judgments regarding the utilization of 
resources. In addition, they have a fiduciary responsibility to protect the business interest 
of the organization. Capitation may give physicians the opportunity to increase their 
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revenue stream by sharing the savings as a result of minimizing costs throughout the 
whole spectrum of care. 
In contrast, personal interviews conducted with several resource managers at a 
Navy MTF, suggest that active duty physicians and other health care providers are not 
directly involved in crafting cost containment strategies. They are also not actively 
involved in planning, managing and implementing effective utilization of resources. 
Usually, they are more concerned with the delivery of quality care than with managing 
resources. 
There was very little integration between the MTF' s executive staff and the 
physicians in the current transition from the traditional incremental budgeting to a 
capitation-based financing system. A majority of active duty physicians and other military 
health care providers may not be familiar with or understand the direction of their 
organizations in their effort to shift from a fee-for-service system to a capitation-based 
financing approach. 
The fiduciary responsibility in the Navy Medical Department to stay within the 
appropriated budget lies exclusively with the Commanding Officer and his Comptroller or 
Fiscal Officer. Active duty physicians do not have any fiduciary responsibilities similar to 
their counterparts in the private sector. The former make clinical judgments free of 
monetary considerations. Furthermore, the majority of the active duty physicians and 
other providers have been insulated from making tough decisions that are required when 
resources get tight. Decisions regarding resources within the MHSS are usually 
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shouldered by the MTF commanders or the health care administrators such as Executive 
Officers, Comptrollers, Directors, and Division or Department Chiefs. 
D. CAPITATION AND THE MTF COMMANDER 
In a capitation-based financing system, each MTF would receive funds to provide 
or arrange for all of the care of an estimated population within its catchment area. Even 
though there is currently no single enrollment plan in the MHSS, MTF commanders are 
expected to spend their funds wisely if given enough flexibility and incentives. For 
example, the MTF commander could hire civilian staff to enhance in-house capabilities, or 
set up satellite clinics run by either military personnel or civilian employees, or sign 
contracts with local HMOs. 
A key objective of capitation-based resource allocation, as it impacts MTFs, is to 
contain cost. There is no incentive to spend additional money because additional 
procedures or workloads will not result in additional funding and the MTF would keep 
any savings generated by capitation-induced efficiencies. These savings could then be 
used to purchase state-of-the-art equipment, upgrade computer technology, or integrate 
information systems. 
Capitation should also provide MTF commanders and medical providers greater 
flexibility to deliver quality care while still controlling costs. Managerial flexibility, 
accompanied by a substantial decentralization of control over resources, is an essential 
ingredient of capitation (Kolb & Horowitz, 1995, p. 68). Such flexibility would allow 
trade offs regarding allocation of resources (i.e., in-house direct care instead of 
CHAMPUS), and flexibility to use "excess" money to enhance mission requirement (e.g., 
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purchase office and medical furnitures, and upgrade existing facilities). One area where 
MTF commanders need flexibility and broad authority to deliver care economically is in 
engaging the optimum mix of primary care and specialty physicians, and determining the 
appropriate rank structure of its active duty staff However, due to current practices 
affecting programming, budgeting and allocating DHP funds, control over funds for active 
duty personnel rests with program managers outside MTF commanders' authority. 
To compensate for constraints on active-duty staff personnel, BUMED has 
exempted MTF commanders from current limits on the numbers of civilian personnel, as it 
had in the years prior to the implementation of a capitation-based budgeting (BUMED 
Memorandum, 15 June 1994). This initiative provides MTF commanders additional 
flexibility and authority over funds from their direct care O&M resources. In essence, 
MTF commanders could hire the appropriate number of civilian employees needed to 
supplement the active duty personnel or use the unexpended salaries of unfilled civilian 
positions to make tradeoffs between delivering care in-house and through managed care 
contracts in the community. 
E. CAPITATION AND RESOURCE MANAGERS AT THE MTF LEVEL 
Information from personal interviews conducted with the Comptroller ofNaval 
Medical Center, San Diego, California, suggests that BUMED' s adoption of a capitation-
based financing system had very little impact on the budgeting, allocation and resource 
management at the MTF level (Leibold, Personal Communication, 18 September 1996). 
Personal interviews conducted with other resource managers at the same MTF, the 
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Healthcare Support Office, San Diego, California, and the Lead Agent for Region 9 also , 
support this claim. 
This observation is further reinforced by a study conducted by IAMETER, a 
civilian consulting group. IAMETER was hired by BUMED to evaluate the impact of 
managed care and capitation-based budgeting at the MTF level. According to 
IAMETER' s report, the fundamental operational knowledge of managed care and 
capitation-based budgeting by executive staff and providers is "not evident" in two large 
MTFs where they conducted the study (IAMETER Report, June 1996, p. 12). This 
report also stated that: 
Sound knowledge of revised financing/capitation by executive management 
and physicians and its implication on facility operations is not evident 
(IAMETER Report, 1996, June 1996, p. 13). 
It appears that as long as the budgeting process and the determination of the 
MTF' s future capitated rate are based on historical costs and workloads, MTF 
commanders and resource managers have a mixed incentives to reduce costs and increase 
operational efficiency in delivering health care services to their beneficiaries. Increasing 
operational efficiency improves their ability to accomplish their military mission, but makes 
their jobs more difficult by lowering their future capitated rate, which could have a direct 
impact on the MTF' s expense operating budget. 
The situation described above is further exacerbated by the political environment 
(too many "bottom lines") where the MTFs operate, and the inherent complexities in the 
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managed care elements employed within the MHSS. The various managed care initiatives 
implemented within the MHSS were discussed in Chapter ill. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis examined how a capitation-based resource allocation model has 
evolved in the Military Health Services System (MHSS) and its impact on resource 
management at the MTF level. To answer this question, one primary and five secondary 
research questions were addressed. The primary question was how does the Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) implement a capitation-based resource allocation 
concept and how is this model being employed to shape budget development at the MTF 
level. The subsidiary questions are as follows: 
(1) What are the origins and purpose of capitation-based resource allocation? 
(2) Why and when did the Department of Defense (DoD) adopt a capitation-
based approach to financing the MHSS? 
(3) What are the major obstacles to the adoption of a capitation-based approach 
within the MHSS, and how is DoD addressing these obstacles? 
( 4) What is the capitation-based resource allocation model adopted by the Bureau 
of Medicine and Surgery and how has it changed its budgeting process to 
meet specific issues affecting Navy medicine? 
( 5) What are the implications of a capitation-based resource allocation model for 
resource managers at the MTF level? 
To answer these questions, Chapter II first provided an overview of managed care 
in the private sector, the different types of managed care organizations, and the elements 
of a managed care network. A capitation-based budgeting system and its salient 
characteristics were defined, and its principal advantages, major disadvantages, and 
potential problems were analyzed. 
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Chapter ill provided an overview of the MHSS direct care system, the TRICARE 
uniform benefit program, and Health Affairs' capitation financing system. Chapter IV 
compared BUMED's capitation-based resource allocation approach with Health Affairs' 
capitation financing system. It also provided an overview of the different information 
systems in support of the implementation of a capitation-based resource allocation system 
within the MHSS. The subsequent section addressed the "readiness-focused" capitation, 
a new programming and budgeting concept adopted by BUMED for POM-98, and 
evaluated its impact on resource management. 
Chapter V presented an analysis and provided findings of the different obstacles 
to implementing a capitation-based financing system within the MHSS, and how DoD is 
addressing these issues. The remaining sections of Chapter V discussed the typical 
incentives facing resource managers at the MTF level and the impact of a capitation-
based budgeting system. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The Military Medical Departments have historically provided care under 
prospectively set budgets. In FY94, DoD adopted and implemented a "modified" 
capitation-based resource allocation model within the MHSS as an alternative to the 
traditional incremental financing mechanism. Capitation was introduced as a way to 
increase coordination of care, offer more flexibility in allocating resources, emphasize 
preventive services, and develop a stronger sense of provider responsibility for patients. 
Capitation was designed to be used in conjunction with other elements of managed care, 
e.g., utilization management, performance outcome, and integrated data-monitoring 
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technique, to achieve cost savings. Some of these elements are aimed at providers, who 
are considered the cost drivers, but are poorly "incentivized" by the DoD's "modified" 
capitation-based financing system. 
Capitation is being attempted within a political and dynamic environment, which 
makes it even more difficult compared with private sector HMOs. That is, Health Affairs 
and the Services are implementing capitation while simultaneously introducing other 
system-wide changes such as business process re-engineering, reducing the size of 
deployable medical platforms, and trying to determine the proper size of the MHSS. 
Another factor that adds to this complexity is the apparent lack of accurate and 
detailed information on the biggest portion of the MHSS beneficiary population, the 
retirees, survivors and their families. As indicated in Chapter I, the retirees, survivors 
and their families represent 50 percent of the MHSS eligible beneficiary population. 
Despite the fact that they are the biggest consumer of health care resources, the MHSS 
has the least information about this group ofbeneficiaries. Due to uncertainty and 
variability in their use of health care resources, it remains difficult to accurately budget 
and forecast health care expenditures at the MTF level. 
To date, the issue regarding fixed costs remains unresolved between Health 
Affairs and the three Services. In addition, due to lack of a consensus among the three 
Services, it is difficult to develop an accurate cost pool for each major capitation 
category. Specifically, MEPRS codes that are directly attributed to readiness and 
readiness training requirements must be isolated and realigned from the medical capitated 
cost (Category ill) to develop an accurate capitated rate for the benefit mission. These 
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are just two examples of some of the issues facing Health Affairs and the Services. 
These examples illustrate the difficulty in developing precise categories for capitation 
within the :MHSS. 
But while some of the benefits may in fact be achieved, the change introduced by 
capitation at the MTF level does not appear to be a shift from an incremental financing 
system. Certainly, it resulted in allocating DHP funds into three major categories, driven 
by each respective beneficiary population, and safeguarding OCONUS, readiness, 
education and training, and other military unique functions. However, this approach 
failed to properly align appropriate incentives with providers' responsibilities and did not 
provide Navy MTF commanders control ofMILPERS and CHAMPUS dollars. In this 
regard, the DoD's capitation-based resource allocation model has not caused a significant 
change in the way resources are allocated and managed at the MTF level. 
Although the Navy Medical Department (HUMED) allocates DHP resources on 
the basis of various capitation categories down to the MTF level, the current allocation 
process blends historical costs and workload considerations. Upon receipt of funds from 
BUMED, Naval Medical Center, San Diego and Naval Hospital, Corpus Christi, (and 
most likely all other MTFs within BUMED) still use the traditional incremental 
budgeting in allocating funds to their various departments. In essence, BUMED's 
adoption of a capitation-based resource allocation model has not reversed the traditional 
system of incremental budgeting practices on the MTF level. Capitation on the MTF 
level boils down to an arbitrary re-allocation of the DHP budget which does little to 
change the providers' attitudes and incentives toward workload and historical costs. 
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Capitation in DoD, as it is currently being implemented on a global basis, is of 
recent vintage. Evidence of its impact at the MTF level is limited. The major findings of 
this research suggest that there are several overarching problems: inappropriate financial 
incentives for providers; crudely differentiated capitated rates between the Services, as 
well as individual MTFs within the same branch of Service; lack of :fundamental 
operational knowledge of managed care and capitation among the MTFs' executive staff 
and physicians; and failure to incorporate adequate information systems for monitoring 
costs and delivery of care. Furthermore, one of the greatest limitations to implementing a 
capitation-based financing system within the MHSS is the apparent lack of participation 
by the physicians and other health care providers in the transition from the incremental 
financing system to this new approach. 
The other finding of this research is that the ability of the MHS S to demonstrate 
cost efficiency compared with private sector HMOs has been limited because of a lack of 
timely and accurate information. This is further exacerbated by inconsistency, 
variability, and inaccuracy of cost data produced by various information systems. One of 
management's responsibilities is to provide detailed clinical and financial information to 
physicians. Invariably, physicians must implement the changes necessary to make sound 
and informed decision making in order to deliver care in the most appropriate and least 
expensive setting. 
Capitation cannot be seen as the answer to an exceedingly complex and 
multifaceted set of problems facing the military's health care delivery system. It does, 
however, show promise as a cost-containing strategy, consolidating important sources of 
137 
funding, and contributing to a more coherent system of managed care. There are several 
serious implementation problems, as described and discussed in Chapter V. The 
magnitude of these problems has yet to be carefully assessed, and the potential 
advantages of capitation may well outweigh any liabilities. 
C. AREASFORFURTHERRESEARCH 
The focus of this research was to determine how DoD's capitation-based resource 
allocation model has evolved and the nature of its impact on resource management at 
Navy MTFs. There are issues associated with capitation-based financing system that 
warrant further research, such as the following: 
(1) How cost efficient and cost effective is the capitated rate per 
patient in a military small hospital compared with a similar size hospital in 
the private sector? 
(2) To what extent can costs decrease while quality is preserved? In this vein, it 
would pe crucial to examine the issue of appropriate substitution between 
inpatient service and less-costly outpatient and residential or "home health" 
care. 
(3) How effective are civilian contractor-provider networks as mechanisms for 
controlling costs for MTFs, when a contractor is at risk but civilian providers 
are still reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis? 
( 4) Does capitation result in the development of more preventive services and 
new outpatient services within the MHSS? 
(5) To what extent do Health Affairs, the Department of the Navy, or the other 
Services use population data such as total numbers of active duty 
beneficiaries, sex, age, military occupational skills, and geographical 
location in determining capitation rates and projecting health care 
expenditures? 
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APPENDIX A- MANAGED HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
Types of Managed Health Care Organizations15 
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION (HMO) 
Health Maintenance Organizations (liMOs) are organized health care systems that are 
responsible for financing and delivering a broad range of comprehensive h~alth services to an 
enrolled population for a prepaid, fixed fee. An HMO can be viewed as a combination of a 
health insurer and a health care delivery system. Whereas traditional health care insurance 
companies are responsible for reimbursing covered individuals for the cost of their health care, 
HMOs are responsible providing health care services to their covered members through affiliated 
providers. 
As a result of their responsibility for providing covered health services to their members, 
HMOs must assure that their members have access to covered health care services. In addition, 
HMOs are generally responsible for assuring the quality and appropriateness of health services 
they provide. 
The five common models ofHMOs are staff, group practice, network, individual practice 
association (IP A), and direct contract. The primary differences between each of these models 
are based on how the HMO relates to its participating physicians. 
Staff Model 
In a staff model HMO, the physicians who serve the HMO's beneficiaries are employed 
by the HMO. These physicians typically are paid on a salary basis and may also receive bonus 
or incentive payments based on their performance and productivity. Staff model HMOs must 
employ physicians in all of the common specialties in order to provide for their members' health 
care needs. These HMOs may contract with selected subspecialists in the community for 
infrequently needed health services. 
Staff model HMOs are also known as "closed panel" HMOs because most participating 
physicians are employees of the HMO. Community physicians are unable to participate. Staff 
model HMOs usually contract with hospitals and other inpatient facilities in the community to 
provide nonphysician services for their members. 
Staff model HMOs can have an advantage relative to other HMO models because they 
have greater control over the practice patterns of their physicians. As a result, it can be easier for 
staff model HMOs to manage and control health services. 
15Source: Kongstvedt, Peter R., ed., The Managed Health Care Handbook, (Rockville: 
Aspen Publishers, Inc, 1996), 11-18. 
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Group Model 
In group model HMOs, the HMO contracts with a multi-specialty physician group 
practice to provide all physician services to the HMO's members. The physicians in the group 
practice are employed by the group practice and not by the HMO. In some cases, these 
physicians may be allowed to see both HMO patients and other patients, although their primary 
function may be to treat HMO members. 
Physicians in group practices share facilities, equipment, medical records, and support 
staff. The group may contract with an HMO on an all-inclusive capitation basis to provide 
physician services to HMO members. Alternatively, the group may contract on a cost basis to 
provide its services. 
Network Model 
In network model HMOs, the HMO contracts with more than one group practice to 
provide physician services to the HMO's members. These group practices may be broad-based, 
multi-specialty groups, in which case the HMO resembles the group model described above. 
Alternatively, the HMO may contract with several small groups of primary care physicians, in 
which case the HMO can be classified as a primary care network model. 
In contrast to staff and group model HMOs, network models may be either closed or 
open panel plans. If the network model HMO is a closed panel plan, it will only contract with a 
limited number of existing group practices. If it is an open panel plan, participation in the group 
practices will be open to any physician who meets the HMO's and group's credentials criteria. 
IPAModel 
IP A model HMOs contract with an association of physicians - the independent practice 
association (IP A) - to provide physician services to their members. The physicians are members 
of the IP A, which is a separate legal entity, but they remain individual practitioners and retain 
their separate offices and identities. IP A physicians continue to see their non-HMO patients and 
maintain their own offices, medical records, and support staff. IP A model HMOs are open panel 
plans because participation is open to all community physicians who meet the HMO's and IP A's 
credentials criteria. 
Direct Contract Model 
As the name implies, direct contract model HMOs contract directly with individual 
physicians to provide physician services to their members. With the exception of their direct 
contractual relationship with participating physicians, direct contract model HMOs are similar to 
IP A model plans. 
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Direct contract model HMOs attempt to recruit broad panels of community physicians to 
provide physician services as participating providers. These HMOs usually recruit both primary 
care and specialist physicians and typically use a primary care case management approach (also 
known as the "gatekeeper'' system). 
Like IP A model plans, direct contract model HMOs compensate their physicians on 
either a fee-for-service basis or primary care capitation basis. Primary care capitation is much 
more commonly used by direct contract model HMOs because it helps to limit the financial risk 
assumed by the HMO. Unlike IP A model HMOs, direct contract model HMOs retain most of 
the financial risk for providing physician services; IP A model plans transfer this risk to their 
IPAs. 
INDEPENDENT PRACTICE ASSOCIATION (IP A) 
An independent practice association (IP A), which is also known as an individual practice 
association, is an association of individual, independent physicians or small groups of physicians 
that has been formed to contract with one or more managed health care organizations. IP As may 
adopt any of several organizational forms, including not-for-profit membership corporations, for-
profit stock corporations, partnerships, and associations. 
IP As serve several important functions for HMOs and other managed health care 
organizations. First, they provide a mechanism for translating capitation payments from an 
HMO into another form of physician payment. HMOs find it desirable to make their payments 
to physicians and other providers on a capitated basis. In contrast, many physicians are reluctant 
to accept capitation payment for their services. Many IP As bridge this gap by accepting 
capitation payments from HMOs and converting these payments into fee-for-service payments to 
individual participating physicians. 
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATION (PPO) 
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are entities through which employer health 
benefit plans and health insurance carriers contract to purchase health care services for covered 
beneficiaries from a select group of participating providers. Typically, participating providers in 
PPOs agree to abide by utilization management and other procedures implemented by the PPO 
and agree to accept the PPO's reimbursement structure and payment levels. In return, PPOs 
often limit the size of their participating provider panels and provide incentives for their covered 
individuals to use participating providers instead of other providers. In contrast to typical HMO 
coverage, individuals with PPO coverage are permitted to use non-PPO providers, although 
higher levels of coinsurance or deductibles routinely apply to services provided by these non-
participating providers. 
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INDEPENDENT PRACTITIONER ORGANIZATION (IPO) 
Independent practitioner organizations (IPOs) are a hybrid form of entity that has 
characteristics in common with both IP As and medical associations. IPOs are generally 
organized by community physicians to evaluate and negotiate participation in HMOs and other 
managed care organizations. Whereas the primary purpose of an IP A is to act as a vehicle for 
physicians to participate in an HMO, the primary purpose of an IPO is to service as a clearing 
house for information about managed health care organizations for its members physicians. 
In general, IPOs do not accept financial risk for providing services to HMO or PPO 
members. Instead, IPOs collect and review information about how the HMOs and PPOs in their 
communities operate so they can advise their members about participation. 
EXCLUSIVE PROVIDER ORGANIZATION (EPO) 
Exclusive provider organizations (EPOs) are similar to PPOs in their organization and 
purpose. Unlike PPOs, however, EPOs limit their beneficiaries to participating providers for 
their health care services. In other words, beneficiaries covered by an EPO are required to 
receive all of their covered health care services from providers that participate with the EPO. 
The EPO does not cover services received from other providers. 
Some EPOs parallel HMOs in that they require exclusive use of the EPO provider 
network and also use a "gatekeeper'' approach to authorize nonprimary care services. In these 
cases, the primary difference between an HMO and an EPO is that the former is regulated under 
HMO laws and regulations while the latter is regulated under insurance laws and regulations. 
EPOs usually are implemented by employers whose primary motivation is cost saving. 
These employers are less concerned about the reaction of their employees to severe restrictions 
on the choice of health care provider. 
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APPENDIX B- STEPS IN DEVELOPING OASD(HA)'S CAPITATION 
REQUIREMENT16 
1. Determine the base year and classify base year obligations by category and subcategory. 
a. The base year is the most recent year for which certified obligations are available. 
b. 0 & M and MILPERS certified obligations are classified by Category 1, 2 or 3 based 
on obligations reported in the official accounting records (Program Elements) by the three 
Military Departments and the Medical Expense Performance Reporting System/Expense 
Assignment System III (MEPRS/EASIII). 
c. Category 3 In-house actual obligations are further subdivided by beneficiary category 
using the ratio ofMEPRS/EASIII expenses by beneficiary category described below. 
(1) Expenses for the year prior to the base year for Category 3 In-house are 
obtained from MEPRS/EASIII. 
(2) In-house expenses are estimated by beneficiary category using the ratio of 
Relative Weighted Products (RWPs) reported in the Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System 
(RCMAS) by beneficiary category for the same year (active duty members, dependents of active 
duty members, retirees/dependents of retirees under age 65, and retirees/dependents of retirees 
age 65 and above). 
(3) The estimated MEPRS/EASIII expenses by beneficiary category determined 
above are divided by the appropriate population of that category to obtain an estimated per capita 
rate. This per capita rate is multiplied by the base year population to obtain an estimate of 
expenses by beneficiary category for the base year. The new ratio of expenses by beneficiary 
category is applied to the certified obligations for Category 3 In-house to estimate obligations by 
beneficiary category for the base year. 
d. Category 3 CHAMPUS certified obligations are subdivided by beneficiary category 
(dependents of active duty members and retirees/dependents of retirees under age 65) using the 
ratio of CHAMPUS expenses by beneficiary category from the CHAMPUS Medical Information 
System. 
(1) CHAMPUS expenses by beneficiary category are obtained from the 
CHAMPUS Medical Information System (CMIS). 
16Source: 733 Update Report of the Working Group No.3 (TRICARE Cost Savings), 
Draft No. 3, 16 May 1996. 
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(2) CHAMPUS expenses for each beneficiary category are divided by the 
population for that category to determine a per capita rate. The per capita rate is multiplied by 
the base year beneficiary population to estimate CHAMPUS expenses for the base year. 
(3) The ratio of estimated CHAMPUS expenses by beneficiary category is used to 
distribute the CHAMPUS certified obligations for the base year by beneficiary category. 
2. Compute the base year per capita rate, where appropriate, by djviding the base year 
obligations by the appropriate base year "driver" for each subcategory and category. 
3. Inflate the base year per capita rate for each subcategory and category using the 
appropriate composite inflation factor for that subcategory or category. The composite inflation 
factors are based on approved OSD inflation rates for DHP. 
4. Multiply the inflated per capita rate by the new target year population to obtain the 
target year raw resource requirement value. 
5. Apply multiplicative factors to the raw resource requirement value to compute a level 
of effort resource requirement. Multiplicative factors include: age/sex adjustment, utilization 
management adjustments, and technology and intensity adjustments. 
(The capitation model currently uses a zero percent factor to account for the resource 
implications of changes in the medical technology/intensity factor. The Institute for Defense 
Analysis (IDA) was commissioned by the Office of the Director, Program, Analysis and 
Evaluation (P A&E) to complete a study to determine the appropriate medical 
technology/intensity factor for the Department. IDA has not yet completed that study). 
6. Make appropriate programmatic adjustments to the computed level-of-effort resource 
requirement. Programmatic adjustments include: foreign currency adjustments, congressional 
marks, BRAC adjustments, etc. 
7. Total the computed level-of-effort resource requirement and all programmatic 
adjustments to determine the final resource requirement. Divide the final resource requirement 
by the appropriate population "driver" to determine the new per capita rate for each subcategory 
and category. 
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APPENDIX C- METHODOLOGY TO DEVELOP A USER POPULATION FOR 
OASD(HA) CAPITATION BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
HOW USER POPULATION IS CALCULATED17 
A. Determine Average Eligible Population 
Projected eligible population is in the Resource Analysis Planning System (RAPS) 
database. The Military Departments project the number of active duty eligibles by zip code and 
Unit Identification Code (UIC). RAPS projects the number of active duty family members using 
historic age and sex dependent ratios of family members and active duty UIC. RAPS projects the 
retirees, their family members and survivors based on data from DoD actuary reports and historic 
DEERS family ratios. RAPS recognizes Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) effects by 
using projected catchment area directories (CAD). 
B. Calculate User Population by Source (Where patient lives) 
OASD(HA) uses an average population rather than the end of year population to more 
accurately reflect the population served during the year. To obtain the average user population, 
OASD(HA) estimates how many eligible beneficiaries in a catchment or noncatchment area rely 
on the MHSS for their medical care (including both direct care and CHAMPUS). RAPS 
calculates user population by source using the full time equivalent (FTE) percentages from the 
MHSS user. 
Active duty (includes medically eligible Guard and Reserves) members are considered to 
be 100 percent users. User percentages for other beneficiary categories vary by catchment area. 
The MHSS user survey provides FTE percentages for the following three categories: 
• Active duty family members including Guard and Reserve family members, 
• Retirees and their family members including survivors and others less than age 65, and 
• Retirees and their family members including survivors and others age 65 and over. 
The resulting user by source population is an estimate of the number of eligibles who use 
the MHSS. However, these user estimates do not identify the health care institution where 
health care is provided. Many beneficiaries "cross over'' catchment area boundaries to obtain 
care. To partition the estimated users by provider, OASD(HA) estimates "cross over usage." 
C. Calculate User Population by Provider (Where patient receives care) 
This calculation adjusts for "cross over" medical care provided by one Military 
Department for beneficiaries who "belong" to another Military Department. For example, a 
17Source: Chan, E., OASD(HA) FY96/97 Budget Outlook, 23 April1996. 
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beneficiary from an Army catchment area routinely gets medical care at a Navy MTF. Under the 
capitation based resource allocation system, the Army receives a specific amount for each user in 
the Army's catchment area. However, in this situation, the beneficiary does not use resources at 
the Army MTF. If no adjustment is made, there is a windfall for the Army and the Navy is 
shortchanged. Another example where "cross over'' implications arise is when an Army 
beneficiary in a noncatchment area receives care in a Navy or Air Force MTF. No "cross over'' 
effect occurs when the Army beneficiary in a noncatchment area gets care in an Army MTF 
because the Army is resourced for that beneficiary. The "cross over'' ratios apply only to the 
direct care system because CHAMPUS costs are billed to the responsible Service regardless of 
where care is provided. 
The Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System (RCMAS) provides data for the "cross 
over" calculation. "Cross over" ratios are based on inpatient data only because detailed 
ambulatory data is not currently available to develop these calculations. 
The "cross-over'' ratios are calculated at the Military Department level. To estimate the 
number of users by provider, OASD(HA) multiplies the number of users by source by the 
corresponding "cross over'' ratio. The results are then re-scaled so that the total DoD users by 
source equals total DoD users by provider. The capitation model distributes the Category m 
resources based on the user by Military Department provider, i.e., total catchment users by 
provider plus total noncatchment users by provider. 
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